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The system of reparations for losses caused by automobiles is
undergoing a fundamental reevaluation in the United States. Oppo-
nents of the traditional tort approach, which places the loss on the
shoulders of negligent drivers and their insurers, have demonstrated
rather convincingly that it is wasteful, inadequate and anachronistic.
It is wasteful because an inordinate amount of time, effort and money
is expended in the disposition of claims which results in the clogging
of courts and reduction of ultimate recoveries; inadequate because
many injured persons remain uncompensated on the theory that they
were negligent or contributorily negligent, and because compensation
is too often delayed or inequitably distributed; and anachronistic
because it is based upon fault principles when it is becoming increas-
ingly apparent that a large proportion of accidents are due to the
inherent risks of driving rather than individual fault.'
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1. See U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Crash Losses and Their Compensation
in the United States 94-100 (1971). This is the final report following a comprehensive two-year
study of the problem undertaken by the Dep't of Transportation, pursuant to J. RES. 129, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (Pub. L. No. 90-313). See also STEWART REPORT 5-55; ROKES 145-71;
O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 299 (1963).
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTI-
CLE:
D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965) [hereinafter cited as CAVERS];
B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1963) [hereinafter cited as
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS];
HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT'L LAW, COLLECTED COURSES [hereinafter cited as HAGUE
COURSES];
R. KEETON AND J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUE-
PRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965) [hereinafter cited as KEETON &
O'CONNELL];
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While there is general agreement on the need for reform, there is
a predictably wide range of opinion about how it should be accom-
plished. On the conservative side, some would retain tort liability,
improve its administration and correct its major inadequacies, espe-
cially by removing contributory negligence as a total bar in favor of
a comparative negligence scheme which would only reduce the size
of recovery.' On the radical side, a far-reaching plan, proposed in
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER];
W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971)
[hereinafter cited as REESE & ROSENBERG];
W. ROKES, No FAULT INSURANCE (1971) [hereinafter cited as ROKES];
R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter cited as
WEINTRAUB];
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES (1971) [hereinafter cited as DOT FINAL REPORT];
STATE OF NEW YORK INSURANCE DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE . . . FOR WHOSE
BENEFIT? (1970) [hereinafter cited as STEWART REPORT];
UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT (5th Tent. Draft 1972)
[hereinafter cited as UNIFORM ACT];
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND
EVALUATE THE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
REPARATIONS (1968) [hereinafter cited as AIA PLAN];
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Comm. Hearings];
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Business, Commerce, and Judiciary of the Senate
Comm. on the District of Columbia, 92 Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate D.
C. Hearings];
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as House Sub-
comm. Hearings];
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter cited as FIRST RESTATEMENT);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter cited as SECOND
RESTATEMENT];
S. 2322, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as D.C. Act];
S. 945, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (revised bill, reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., ist Sess., pt. 5, at 2096 (1971)) [hereinafter cited as Hart
Bill];
H.R. 1022, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as Moss Bill];
Bill No. 8922, N.Y. Senate, March 16, 1970; Bill No. 6133, N.Y. Assembly, March 10,
1970 [hereinafter cited as Stewart Bill];
Bill No. 8000, N.Y. Senate, February 2, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Gordon Bill],
Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Juenger].
2. See ABA Report of the Special Committee on Automobile Accident Reparations No.
18 (1969), approved by the House of Delegates of the ABA at its 1969 Annual Meeting. The
Report is summarized in DOT FINAL REPORT 113-16. In view of the continuing debate on no-
fault, the ABA appointed, in May, 1971, a Special Committee on Auto Insurance Legislation
to review the new developments. In a major departure from prior policy, the Special Committee
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1965 by Professors Keeton and O'Connell, would abolish negligence
liability for the bulk of personal injury losses, relying on a new con-
cept of compulsory insurance for their reparation.3 The Keeton-
O'Connell "Basic Protection Plan," commonly referred to as "no-
fault," has had a stormy and spectacular career. While variations in
method and scope have proliferated, the fundamental premises of no-
fault, though furiously debated, have received considerable accept-
ance and are now being translated into legislation in several states.
Massachusetts was first to enact a modest no-fault plan in 1970, and
Florida, Delaware, Illinois, Oregon and South Dakota have adopted
statutes with some no-fault features.' In addition, the government of
Puerto Rico operates a no-fault plan financed through a license fee.'
No-fault legislation is also under consideration in many other
states. The most comprehensive state plan was prepared by the New
York Department of Insurance in 1970. Under this plan, negligence
liability would be totally abolished and be replaced generally by an
prepared an interim report recommending that the states require auto insurance policies to
provide at least $2,000 in first-party medical, wage loss and related economic benefits, payable
by the victim's insurer without regard to fault. The Special Committee estimated that the $2,000
minimum would cover the total economic losses sustained by nearly 95% of traffic accident
victims. The tort cause of action, however, would remain unaffected, except that pain and
suffering recoveries could not exceed medical expenses for amounts of less than $500. No action
is expected to be taken on the Special Committee report until the annual meeting of August
11-17, 1972. ABA, News Release, Jan. 30, 1972. See also DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
RESPONSIBLE REFORM: A PROGRAM TO IMPROVE THE LIABILITY REPARATION SYSTEM (1969).
3. See generally KEETON & O'CONNELL.
4. Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 2118 (1971).
Florida: FLA. GEN. LAWS ch. 71-252 (1971).
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065-.150 to -.63 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972). A lower
court held that this legislation is unconstitutional because it arbitrarily discriminates against
the uninsured and against the poor insofar as pain and suffering damages are concerned. Grace
v. Howlett, 71 CH4737 (Cook County Civ., Dec. 29, 1971) (reproduced in full in 8 TRIAL 10-
1I, 13 (Jan./Feb. 1972)). This ruling was upheld on appeal by the Illinois Supreme Court. See
40 U.S.L.W. 2692-3 (April 25, 1972). The Illinois legislation could be modified, however, to
eliminate the allegedly arbitrary distinctions without affecting the substance of no-fault.
Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34A, D, M, N; id. ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1971).
The constitutionality of this legislation against challenges under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, principally because of the taking away of
the tort remedy and because of the disallowance of damages for pain and suffering when
medical expenses do not exceed $500, was upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Pinnick
v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971).
Oregon: Laws 1971, H.B. No. 1300.
South Dakota: S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 58-23-6 to -23-8 (Supp. 1971).
5. Automobile Accident Social Protection Act (No. 138), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2051-
65 (1968).
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insurance recovery for economic loss.' In addition, the prestigious
Association of the Bar of the City of New York recently espoused a
pure no-fault reparation system for economic losses, with no residual
tort liability,7 a position already embraced by the American Insur-
ance Association.' The reformers' cause received a major boost in
1971 when the United States Department of Transportation (DOT),
after a comprehensive study, issued a report favoring universal, com-
pulsory no-fault insurance for automobiles for all but the most seri-
ous economic losses.9 The DOT recommendations would, in essence,
be enacted and expanded at the national level by bills introduced in
the Senate by Senators Hart and Magnuson,10 and in the House by
Representatives Moss and Eckhardt." These congressional bills
would remove most of the automobile accident reparations from the
ambit of state tort law. At this point, however, the Nixon Adminis-
tration prefers, as a matter of principle, to give the states time to act
on the DOT recommendations, with federal action remaining in the
background only as a last resort." The Administration seems to be
under pressure, however, and would probably be amenable to a com-
promise which would set up certain federal minimum standards for
the states to follow.1 3 In the meantime, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has set up a special
6. STEWART REPORT 83-100. The recommendations of the STEWART REPORT were put into
the form of an Act-the Stewart Bill. The present status of no-fault in New York is discussed
at note 150 infra and accompanying text.
7. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1972, at 1, cols. 5-7; at 53, cols. 7-8.
8. AIA PLAN. The American Insurance Association, representing most of the stock compa-
nite, is only one of the three major trade associations in the insurance field. The two others,
the National Association of Independent Insurers and the American National Insurance Alli-
ance, are generally opposed to no-fault.
9. DOT FINAL REPORT 133-37.
10. See Hart Bill. The original Hart-Magnuson Bill (reprinted in Senate Comm. Hearings
305) was redrafted following the first round of senate committee hearings. See id. at 2096.
I1. See Moss Bill (essentially identical with the Hart Bill, except that no-fault insurance
for non-economic loss, mostly pain and suffering, is made mandatory). An earlier version of
the House Bill, H.R. 7514, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), formed the basis for the house subcom-
mittee hearings.
12. At the request of the Administration, Representative Staggers introduced H.R. Res.
241, 92d Cong., I st Sess. (1971), which urges the states to embrace the general no-fault concept,
but leaves the scope and methods of implementation to them. In addition, the Secretary of
Transportation is authorized and directed to develop model legislation, to provide technical
assistance and to follow the progress made at the state level with a view to reporting to Congress
within 25 months. For-the text of the Resolution, see House Subcomm. Hearings 3-8. Transpor-
tation Secretary Volpe testified extensively in support of this resolution. See id. at 89-121.
13. See 7 TRIALS 59 (July/Aug. 1971). See also Senate Comm. Hearings 2294.
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committee which is engaged in drafting a Uniform Motor Vehicle
Accident Reparations Act to serve as a model for the states. 4
The enemies of no-fault, principally trial lawyers' associations
and certain insurance groups, are, of course, against the introduction
of no-fault on a national scale, as they have also been at the state
level. When these opponents fail to defeat no-fault altogether, they
strive to water it down by limiting its scope, making it voluntary and
retaining tort liability as an alternative. Thus, the legislation eventu-
ally enacted in Illinois and Oregon includes only one minor no-fault
feature, namely medical and wage loss protection of modest dimen-
sions. Tort liability, however, is fully retained except that in Oregon
comparative negligence replaces contributory negligence and in Illi-
nois a general ceiling, with certain exceptions, is placed on damages
recoverable for pain and suffering. 5 In South Dakota, token optional
no-fault coverage must be offered to prospective insureds, but tort
liability is otherwise unaffected. 8
It is too early to predict the outcome of the no-fault versus neglig-
ence liability battle. If the Congress does not preempt the field by
adopting a comprehensive national plan, it is possible, if not likely,
that the strong sentiment for no-fault will produce a repetition of the
workmen's compensation story, with a few pioneering states intro-
ducing some form of no-fault, with many others following their lead
within five to ten years, and with the balance coming around in the
long run. 7 If opposition to no-fault remains strong, however, a per-
14. The Special Committee began holding monthly meetings and it is expected that a final
tentative draft of the Uniform Act will be completed by the late spring of 1972. See 39 INS.
COUNSEL J. 21 (1972). The Committee has already gone through a series of tentative drafts,
the fifth of which is the latest presently available. UNIFORM AcT.
15. Illinois: ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 73, §§ 1065-.153 to -. 158 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972). See
also Illinois Dep't of Insurance, Auto Reparations in Illinois-The Illinois Plan (1971)
(reproduced in House Subcomm. Hearings 1251-1303); O'Connell, Critique of the Illinois Auto
Reparations Plan, reproduced in House Subcomm. Hearings 199-201; Hofeld, Toward Under-
standing, Analyzing and Improving "No-Fault" in Illinois, 1971 INS. L.J. 403-13.
Oregon: § 2, 7-9. See Oregon Drops No-Fault, 7 TRIAL 58 (July/Aug. 1971). For a critique
of both plans, see ROKES 6-7.
16. South Dakota: S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 58-23-6 to -23-8 (Supp. 1971).
17. See I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 5.20-.30 (1968). Ac-
cording to Senator Adlai Stevenson III, "it took 40 years to achieve nationwide workmen's
compensation reform through a state-by-state approach. We will be lucky if we can reform the
auto accident reparations system in 40 years on a state-by-state basis." Senate Comm.
Hearings 2125.
There is increasing support around the country, however, for some form of no-fault and it
appears that the issue will be considered by the legislatures of most states in 1972. It is reported
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manent stalemate may result, with some states switching to no-fault
while others retain negligence liability. In either case, a "crazy-quilt"
pattern lasting for many years is quite likely to develop, and the
problems of choice of law will be multiplied to an unprecedented
degree.
After a brief introduction into the fundamentals of no-fault, the
present article will concentrate on the choice of law complications of
the "crazy-quilt" situation. The interstate features of the various no-
fault plans will be reviewed against the background of modern con-
flicts theory and practice, and the case for adopting a personal (domi-
ciliary), rather than a territorial, approach will be developed. In view
of the many issues involved, however, emphasis will be placed on the
personal injury, rather than the death or property damage, aspects
of the plans.
TORT LIABILITY V. No-FAULT-A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
IN AUTOMOBILE REPARATIONS
Under traditional principles, automobile accidents are treated as
torts and the injured persons may recover their losses from the
wrongdoer, usually the negligent driver of the automobile that hit
them or in which they were riding. The loss is eventually shifted to
the insurer of the driver, or possibly the owner, of the involved auto-
mobile if it happens to be covered by a liability policy. Many states
have financial responsibility laws requiring those involved in
accidents to obtain liability insurance, but only three states have
compulsory insurance laws, enforced through the registration pro-
cess, imposing a general insurance requirement.'" The existence of
insurance, however, is supposed to be of no relevance to the determi-
nation of liability, its function being simply one of underwriting
losses.
that the American Insurance Association will introduce "pure no-fault" type legislation in to
all the 33 states holding regular sessions and the 3 having special sessions this year. No Fault:
A Legislative Bomb of 1972, 8 TRIAL 8 (Jan./Feb. 1972).
18. New York, Massachusetts and North Carolina. CCH AUTO. L. REP.
[Insurance] 1400 (1971). For a detailed discussion of compulsory liability insurance, see
KEETON & O'CONNELL 76-102.
For a discussion of developments in the direction of compulsory automobile insurance in
Europe, see Gerdes, The European Convention on Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance, 1971
INS. L.J. 297, 297-303; Pfennigstorf, Unification of the Protection of Traffic Victims in Europe,
15 AM. J. COMP. LAW 436, 436-56. See also UNIDROIT, UNIFICATION OF LAW (YEARBOOK
1961) 156-75 (1962).
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In this setting, the choice of law question is what law will govern
the tort liability of the wrongdoer to the victim. Under the traditional
conflicts approach of the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws this
issue would have been resolved under the lex loci delicti-that is, the
law of the place of the accident. 9 In modern conflicts theory and
practice, however, this monistic approach has been rejected and a
host of connecting factors are relied upon to furnish guidance in
resolving particular conflicts disputes. Nevertheless, the issue to be
decided remains one of tort liability. If liability is present, a further
question is whether the loss comes within the insurance coverage, if
any, which calls for the interpretation and application of the insur-
ance contract. Traditionally, liability insurance contracts were said
to be governed by the law of the place where they were made, but
courts have often been able to find their way to the law of the in-
sured's domicil either by equating the place of the making to the place
of delivery or by relying upon a statutory directive."0 There has re-
cently been more direct recognition of the importance of the insured's
domicil, especially when the automobile is also located there and the
domiciliary law is favorable to him.2' The law of the place of the
19. FIRST RESTATEMENT §§ 378-90.
20. See 2 G. COUCH ON INSURANCE §§ 16:2, 16:6, 16:20 (2d ed. 1959); Risjord, Conflict
of Laws Applicable to the Standard Automobile Liability Policy, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 586;
Lenhoff, Conflict Avoidance in Insurance, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 549, 560-62 (1956). An
exhaustive study of early insurance cases disclosed that in about three quarters of them the
court located the place of contracting at the domicil of the insured. See 3 E. RABEL, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 321, 348 (2d ed. 1964). See also E. PATTERSON,
ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 56-57 (2d ed. 1957). Charles D. Baker, Assistant Secretary
for Policy and International Affairs of the Department of Transportation, repeatedly referred
to the conformity of the liability insurance contract with the law of the insured's domicil or
home state. House Subcomm. Hearings 116-18. On the impact of insurance regulatory statutes
on the choice of law, see E. RABEL, supra, at 325-30; Lenhoff, supra, at 555-56.
21. See 2 COUCH, supra note 20, § 16:19.5 (Supp. 1971); Lenhoff, supra note 20, at 551.
Cf. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 193, dealing with the contracts of fire, surety and casualty insur-
ance, including automobile liability and workmen's compensation insurance, which calls for the
application of the law of the state of the principal location of the insured risk, unless some other
state has a more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties. The SECOND
RESTATEMENT recognizes:
In the nature of things, the policy will usually be solicited in the state of the insured's
domicile and usually the insured risk will also be located there. In the normal case,
therefore, the policy will have been solicited and delivered and the last act necessary to
make the contract binding will have taken place in the state where the insured is domi-
ciled . . . . This state, in such a situation, will usually be the state of the applicable law,
at least with respect to most issues. Id., comment b, at 611.
The SECOND RESTATEMENT approach is similar to that of a tentative draft of the Uniform
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accident, the lex loci delicti, as such is generally irrelevant.22
A review of the essentials of no-fault shows that a radical change
in the philosophy and structure of automobile reparations has taken
place?13 Starting from the premise that accidents are generally an
inherent hazard of driving, no-fault views most injured persons as
victims entitled to recover for their losses without any reference to
culpability.24 On this basis, no-fault takes the giant step of removing
automobile accident reparations, at least in most cases that involve
ordinary negligence, from the realm of tort liability, thus virtually
abandoning any attempt to use the rules governing such reparations
for deterrence and punishment purposes. The object of the law is to
compensate the injured persons as efficiently and equitably as possi-
ble by spreading the losses to the motoring public. The distribution
is accomplished through compulsory insurance which constitutes the
backbone of the no-fault system and is responsible for the reference
Statute proposed before the Section of Insurance Law of the American Bar Association in 1940.
See E. PATTERSON, supra note 20, at 54. It has also been said that "residence by itself may
well suffice for localizing all types of insurance not connected with another unquestionable
central point." E. RABEL, supra note 20, at 351-52.
In the following cases, the domicil or residence of the insured was referred to in making a
choice of the applicable law: American Service Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bottum, 371 F.2d 6 (8th
Cir. 1967); Seguros Tepeyac, S.A. v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965); Lowery v, Kovac,
CCH AUTO. L. REP. [Insurance] 6946 (D. Conn. 1971); Breen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur, Co.,
153 Conn. 633, 220 A.2d 254 (1966); Stevens v. American Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 234 A.2d 305
(D.C. Ct. App. 1967); Public Serv. Coordinated Transp. v. Mario Trucking Co., 108 N.J.
Super. 232, 260 A.2d 855 (1970); Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J, 475, 170
A.2d 22 (1961); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 109 N.H. 108, 244 A.2d 199 (1968); Fisk v.
Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 108 N.H. 353, 236 A.2d 688 (1967); Connor v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 188, 143 S.E.2d 98 (1965); Urhammer v. Olson, 39 Wis. 2d 447, 159 N.W.2d
688 (1970); Peterson v. Warren, 31 Wis. 2d 547, 143 N.W.2d 560 (1966).
The preference for the law of the insured's home state is even more pronounced in the life
insurance field. See C. CARNAHAN, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS 250,
486-87 (2d ed. 1958); E. PATTERSON, supra note 20, at 54-55. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 192.
In continental Europe there is also considerable support for the application of the law of the
insured's domicil in life, health and accident insurance contracts. See E. RABEL, supra note 20,
at 348.
22. See COUCH, supra note 20, § 16:13.
23. The discussion that follows is based on a composite picture of no-fault consisting of
the main discernible trends of the major plans. See ROKES 3-5.
24. The emphasis has shifted from punishing the wrongdoer to protecting the automobile
accident victim. Marryott, The Tort System and Automobile Claims: Evaluating the Keeton-
O'Connell Proposal, 52 A.B.A.J. 639, 643 (1966). It has been said that:
The whole thrust of the evolution of automobile insurance . . . has been to focus on
the plight of the injured party in the automobile accident. Punishment of the guilty driver
is a secondary consideration and a minor one at that. ROKES 213.
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to it as "no-fault insurance."' 5 The system is comprehensive in that
it covers all victims and places responsibility on all automobile own-
ers. Indemnity or liability insurance concepts are superceded by so-
cial insurance considerations. The insured owners are not merely
protecting their solvency but are legally exempted from liability, be-
cause the idea is to compensate the victim rather than to right a
wrong. Correspondingly, victims recover only no-fault benefits,
usually limited to their basic economic losses. In terms of allocation
of responsibility, the owner is required to insure the occupants of his
automobile and the pedestrians who may be injured by it, but not the
occupants of another automobile involved in a collision, since they
are to be covered by the insurance of such other automobile. Injured
persons need not bring suit against their own personal insurer, except
as a residual matter when the automobile was uninsured, and are
protected through an assigned claims plan even when they do not
happen to carry insurance.
The no-fault insurance system is often referred to as "first-party,"
in contradistinction to the "third-party" nature of liability insur-
ance. This nomenclature is not entirely accurate. If one were to
go all the way and treat the automobile accident as akin to a natural
calamity, the insurance would be truly first-party in the sense that it
would be incumbent upon the victims to protect themselves in a
manner comparable to accident, health or other casualty insurance,
looking to their own insurer for loss coverage. Such insurance could
be voluntary or be made compulsory if the medical and income-
continuation features were viewed in a social security spirit. The no-
fault proposals, however, do not follow this path. Rather, they pre-
serve so much of the traditional system as places the burden of loss
on automobile owners. Accordingly, substantial categories of victims
recover from insurers with whom they have had no previous relation-
ship. It is only the injured owner and his family who, strictly speak-
ing, recover first-party benefits. Recovery by other occupants and
pedestrians is more in the nature of third-party strict liability, espe-
cially under the plans which hold the uninsured owner personally
liable as a self-insurer.26 On the other side of the argument, one might
view these people as a class which is to come under the insurance
umbrella of the owner as his proteges, so to speak, or as third-party
25. See KEETON & O'CONNELL 256-72.
26. STEWART REPORT 84.
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beneficiaries, rather than as claimants against him. This interpreta-
tion is strengthened by the exclusion from the insurance umbrella of
the main group of tort claimants, namely the occupants of other
vehicles.
The exact characterization of the nature of no-fault insurance
may not be a matter of substantive importance, but the first-party
emphasis is helpful in that it underscores the major shift which has
taken place from liability to loss reparation. In addition, whether the
no-fault insurance is first- or third-party may have a bearing upon
the resolution of the choice of law problem in this area. In first-party
type insurance situations, where the victims of loss are supposed to
take out insurance on their own, the place of the accident is practi-
cally irrelevant in deciding what law is applicable. Reparations are
governed by the terms of the policy which, in most instances, has been
issued in and under the law of the insured's domicil.2Y Third-party
type insurance, however, presupposes that there is someone else who
is responsible and the loss is to be covered by his insurance; and in
allocating and measuring substantive responsibility, the place of the
accident has traditionally been a key factor for choice of law pur-
poses.
Under no-fault, the conflicts question arises in the following form:
When and for whom should the owner and/or driver be required to
obtain insurance, and when and from whom should he be shielded
from liability? Conversely, in what circumstances should a victim be
subjected to, and get the benefit of, the no-fault plan of a particular
owner? Whatever the characterization of the nature of no-fault, this
is a responsibility-type question-so that the domiciliary and per-
sonal considerations that prevail in insurance conflicts may not be
treated as dispositive of the issue. Thus, it is still important to look
for guidance to the conflicts rules for torts, with the trends in insur-
ance conflicts remaining as auxiliary considerations.
THE CONFLICTS COMPLICATIONS OF No-FAULT
Considering that the major conflicts controversies and the sub-
stantial majority of conflicts cases in recent years have related to
automobile accidents, despite the fact that the rules of negligence
liability are generally the same in most states, and taking into ac-
27. See note 21 supra.
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count the magnitude of the automobile loss reparations problem,28 it
is easy to understand why the juxtaposition of multifarious no-fault
plans to the traditional tort system in a "crazy-quilt" pattern evokes
images of monstrous complexity. This was demonstrated rather
clearly during the congressional hearings on the Hart Plan when
witnesses repeatedly commented on the chaos, confusion and
complication that was bound to result if the states were to be left on
their own to decide what, if anything, to do about no-fault.
29
This almost apocalyptic vision may be exaggerated, but it does
contain many grains of truth. Even during the golden age of certainty,
uniformity and simplicity under the lex loci delicti rule of the First
Restatement, automobile accidents produced more than their share
of conflicts problems. The modern conflicts methodologies, which
subordinate these objectives to the quest for a just and sensible result,
have created a state of fluidity, where choice of law is no longer
automatic but involves rather the evaluation of many factors for a
custom-made resolution of conflicts disputes. As a result, the choice
of law process has become increasingly elaborate and unpredictable.
28. It is estimated that in 1967 about 24,300,000 vehicles were involved in accidents result-
ing in the death of 50,000 and injuries to 4,200,000 persons. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 557 (1969). The statistics compiled by the
National Safety Council show that about one-seventh of all fatal accidents and one-twelfth of
all accidents involve drivers who were not residents of the states in which the accidents occurred.
Senate Comm. Hearings 1660. In areas of substantial interstate travel, the incidence of out-
of-state vehicles involved in local accidents may increase sharply. For example, for the District
of Columbia, it has been estimated that such incidence stands at 40%. Id. at 2124.
Without a national plan, the number of cases with choice of law complications would be
measured in the hundreds of thousands. Cf The Keeton-O'Connell Plan-Some Questions and
Answers, 9 FOR THE DEFENSE 25 (1968).
29. In his testimony before the House Subcommittee, Judge John T. Reardon of Illinois
said that "[I]t boggles the mind to figure out what would happen" in choice of law if the no-
fault system was placed on top of the traditional theories of liability. House Subcomm.
Hearings 1074. In the same hearings, Representative Eckhardt repeatedly expressed the fear
that if diversity were to replace the present-day substantial uniformity of state laws relating to
automobile accidents, conflict of laws would be thrown into a condition of absolute chaos. Id.
at 114-15. Pennsylvania's Insurance Commissioner Herbert S. Denenberg went even so far as
to suggest, presumably in a half-joking manner, that the many lawyers who would be put out
of business by no-fault could find another occupation in figuring out the problems of diversity!
Id. at 242.
Comparable predictions of dire conflicts consequences were made at the hearings held in
the spring of 1971 before the Senate Committee on Commerce. See Senate Comm. Hearings
.412 ("the computers would get tired figuring. . . what the applicable law is"), 911 (choice of
law difficulties will lead to "some very serious legal and insurance problems"), I 110 ("tremen-
dous confusion concerning which law governs and what system of compensation applies"), 1660
(one "shudders" when he tries to figure out what law would apply).
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The introduction of a drastic change in automobile loss reparations,
such as no-fault, in various forms and in a piecemeal fashion, would
create myriads of possibilities and complicate the conflicts problems
to a point where the outcome might well depend more on prophetic
insight than on a reasoning process.
The Hart-Moss Plan
It is obvious that the adoption of a substantial no-fault plan, such
as the Hart-Moss Plan, at the national level would deflate and signifi-
cantly reduce the conflicts problem. Since this Plan has such signi-
ficant conflicts ramifications, it is necessary that it be considered in
some detail. There are two innovative features of the Plan incorpo-
rated in the Hart and Moss bills. First, tort liability of automobile
owners and drivers for personal injuries caused by negligence in the
operation of insured automobiles anywhere in the United States is
generally abolished. 0 This is referred to as the "tort exemption."
Second, all automobiles are required to carry insurance, covering the
net "economic loss" of all injured persons, except occupants of other
automobiles and persons engaging in certain criminal conduct.31 In
addition, under the Hart bill the insurance policy may, and under the
Moss bill it must, provide for no-fault benefits for non-economic
losses, particularly pain and suffering and general damages. How-
ever, such benefits are generally not payable until economic loss
benefits cease or until a period of three years from the time of the
injury has elapsed, whichever occurs first.32 Registering or know-
ingly driving an uninsured automobile is made a criminal offense and
disqualifies the registrant or driver from receiving no-fault bene-
fits.3 3 In addition, the registrant and/or knowing driver of such
uninsured automobile remain personally liable in tort.34 Except for
the mandatory policy provisions and certain requirements for insur-
ance companies, the Plan does not expressly purport to affect the
30. Hart Bill, Moss Bill, § 3. Persons engaged in criminal conduct remain liable in tort
under state law for damages other than economic loss.
31. Hart Bill, Moss Bill, §§ 4(a), 5(a). Economic loss is defined to include all medical costs,
funeral expenses, costs of substitution services and loss of income up to $1,000 per month.
Id. § 2(14).
32. Hart Bill §§ 5(c)(2), (3); Moss Bill §§ 5(b), (c).
33. Hart Bill, Moss Bill, §§ 4(c), 7(e).
34. Id. §§ 3, 7().
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power of the states to regulate insurance companies and policies.35
By requiring the extension of the insurance coverage over certain
specific categories of persons and losses, the Plan overrides precisely
those features of state laws where differences have been producirig
most of the choice of law controversies: guest statutes, immunities,
vicarious liabilities, contributory negligence rules, limitations on
damages, direct-action statutes and uninsured motorist statutes.
By far the most important mandatory policy clause is the one
which extends no-fault benefits not only to the owner, operator or
user of the insured automobile, but also to all of its occupants and
to pedestrians injured by it.3 By a stroke of the pen, this clause
renders inoperative the guest statutes and the intra-family and chari-
table immunities, which are now in effect in many states and which
leave substantial categories of persons without a remedy for automo-
bile injuriesY.3 Under the Plan, a guest, a spouse or a child riding in
the automobile, or hurt by it, is entitled to the same recovery as all
others. By making benefits under the owner's policy directly available
to the victims, regardless of who may have been the operator, the
Plan also resolves the vicarious liability question in favor of the in-
jured parties.38 While most states accept contributory negligence as
a complete defense39 so that few conflicts have arisen on this point,4"
there is substantial divergence in the allocation of the burden of proof
or of going forward with the evidence. In most states, it is the plaintiff
35. Id. §§ 6, 10.
36. Id. § 5(a)(1). See also ROKES 4.
37. Twenty-eight states either completely bar claims by guests against hosts in automobile
accidents or require a showing of more than ordinary negligence. See WEINTRAUB 207; CCH
AUTO L. REP. [Insurance] 1041, 1045, 1050 (1970). In about two-thirds of the states,
actions between spouses for negligently caused automobile injuries are barred-that is, there
is an intra-spousal immunity. PROSSER 864. Most states also bar tort actions between parents
and children-that is, there is an intra-family immunity. Id. at 867-68. The immunity of
charitable organizations from liability for the negligent actions of their employees is now
recognized only in a minority of the states. Id. at 994-95.
38. On the vicarious liability of the automobile owner for the driver's negligence under state
law, see PROSSER 481-86. See also SECOND RESTATEMENT § 174. It is interesting to note that
the unknowing driver of an uninsured automobile is shielded from liability under section three
of both the Hart Bill and the Moss Bill, but in a peculiar twist, the benefits payable under his
no-fault policy, if any, are not made available to the victim.
39. Only about a dozen states reject contributory negligence as a bar to the action and
follow a "comparative negligence" approach, under which the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence goes to the reduction of damages. PROSSER 436-37.
40. See SECOND RESTATEMENT Reporter's Notes § 164, at 498; cf. Frummer v. Hilton
Hotels Int'l, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 840, 304 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Kings County 1969).
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who must show his freedom from contributory negligence, whereas
in others the defendant must establish plaintiff's contributory neglig-
ence.4 The question of whether a court should treat the issue as
procedural and apply the law of the forum or as substantive, which
would call for the application of the law that governs the tort, has
not received a uniform answer. 2 The Plan simply eliminates this
choice of law issue altogether and allows the victim to recover under
the insurance policy regardless of fault. The various limitations on the
amount of damages recoverable, especially for death, which are in
force in a number of states, have given rise to a host of much-debated
conflicts cases involving automobile or airplane accidents. 3 Under
the Plan, in case of death claimants are assured of full no-fault bene-
fits of their losses. 4
A few states enable the traffic victim to sue the wrongdoer's
insurer directly and primarily. 5 Since the Plan by its conception is a
direct action statute,4 it will also no longer be necessary to puzzle
over the choice of law aspects of this issue, and the same will be true
for the "no-action" clauses in insurance policies which block an ac-
tion by the victim against the insurer until a judgment against the
wrongdoer has been obtained. Since the benefits will be recoverable
from the insurer, the no-action obstacle will be removed from the
scene. State financial responsibility or compulsory insurance laws
often require that a policy cover the insured parties against injury by
uninsured or unidentifiable motorists. 8 There have been disputes on
41. PROSSER 416.
42. See SECOND RESTATEMENT §§ 133-34; id. Reporter's Notes, .§ 133-34, at 368-69, 373-
74.
43. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967), discussed in
Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 552 (1968); Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d
12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968); Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 16
N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9
N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1,
203 A.2d 796 (1964); DeFoor v. Lematta, 249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968), discussed In
Symposium: Conflict of Laws Roundtable, 49 TEx. L. REV. 211 (1971). Fourteen states limit
wrongful death damages in some way.
44. Hart Bill, Moss Bill, §§ 5(a)(1)(B), 5(b)(l).
45. PROSSER 544-45,
46. Hart Bill, Moss Bill, §§ 5(a), (b).
47. See SECOND RESTATEMENT § 162. This issue is also alive in Europe. For an interesting
French conflicts case and accompanying comment, see Veuve Lecoq c. Peveril et Cie London
Garanty, 60 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV9 [REV. CRIT. D.I.P.] 67-75
(1971).
48. See C. BRAINARD, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ch. 9 (1961); ROKES 29-30; CCH AUTO.
L. REP. [Insurance] 1190, 1500 (1970).
[Vol. 1972:331
NO-FA ULT INSURANCE
what law should apply to determine, for example, who is an uninsured
motorist. 9 By specifically defining the categories of persons who are
entitled to claim through assigned plans,5" the Plan will also eliminate
this conflicts problem.
The suppression through federalization of these state law differ-
ences would leave a few areas, mostly of secondary importance,
where conflicts may still arise. The most significant of these conflicts
relates to the inclusion in the insurance of coverage for non-economic
loss, chiefly pain and suffering, which is to be payable only if due
under the applicable state law. Other conflicts situations might arise
where the automobile is uninsured and the owner remains liable
under state law. Furthermore, a driver engaged in criminal conduct
is not shielded by the tort exemption, at least insofar as non-economic
losses are concerned." Finally, the Plan does not dictate the full terms
of the insurance policy, and variations may spring up at the state level
on the validity and effectiveness of clauses. The problems might occur
in provisions requiring notice of claim and cooperation as a condition
to insurer liability, and those dealing with optional coverage. These
variations may still lead to choice of law questions.
All in all, the drastic reduction of conflicts in the automobile
accident field which will be brought about as a consequence of the
adoption of the Hart-Moss Plan will undoubtedly be greeted with
sighs of relief by the beleaguered judges who have had to agonize over
their resolution. One might even be tempted to speculate that the
conflicts decongestion, which will follow the adoption of a national
plan, will bring about some dtente in conflicts theory in general,
where conditions remain unsettled following years of vigorous and
almost violent challenge to the traditional wisdom.
The fate of the Hart-Moss Plan, however, is uncertain at present:
the state-by-state approach is favored by the Nixon Administration,
and a draft Uniform Act is in the process of preparation.12 Even if
some action is taken at the federal level there is no assurance that it
49. See. e.g., Ramirez v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. App. 3d 622, 91 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1970).
50. Hart Bill, Moss Bill, §§ 7(d), (e).
51. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text. The Hart and Moss Bills leave the
question of choice of the applicable state law completely open, so presumably it will be governed
under tort conflicts rules and methodologies of the states involved.
52. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
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will be as far reaching as the Hart-Moss Plan.53 Thus, the odds at
this juncture appear to be in favor of the resolution of the no-fault
versus negligence-liability controversy at the local level,54 with all
resultant potential variations and conflicts complications.
The State No-Fault Plans
If there is a common feature of the state no-fault plans, proposed
or enacted, it is their extreme diversity of structure and coverage.55
The enacted plans are quite modest in dimensions," the proposed
Stewart Plan for New York and the A.I.A. Plan are all-encom-
passing,57 with the Keeton-O'Connell Plan falling in between. 8
The plans also differ widely on such particulars as insurance require-
ments and consequences of failure to insure, the fixing of primary
insurer liability, the scope of the tort exemption and the availability
of alternative recovery in tort, the definition of the classes of persons
who are eligible to recover no-fault benefits and many others.
Apparently recognizing that a conflicts nightmare is bound to
result in the absence of some statutory guidance on sphere of applica-
tion, all of the major no-fault plans include express provisions speci-
fying the situations covered and those that are excluded. Here again,
however, there is a bewildering diversity of approach. One can find
examples of an almost exclusive territorial approach, with reliance on
the law of the locus of the accident; of a mainly personal approach,
where applicability of the plan depends upon the status of the persons
and automobiles involved; and of combinations of these factors. It
does not take a great deal of imagination to visualize the veritable
chaos that could result if diversities of conflicts rules were added to
53. For example, Mr. Benjamin Schenk, New York Superintendent of Insurance, stunned
the House Subcommittee by proposing that Congress do nothing more than abolish the "law-
suits based on tort to recover damages for automobile accidents" without adopting a substitute
system, in particular a national no-fault insurance plan. House Subcomm. Hearings 328. The
states would then be in effect forced to take some action to provide compensation for automo-
bile victims through another system, most likely through insurance. The Subcommittee mem-
bers were apparently less sanguine than Mr. Schenk on the likelihood of the states' taking
effective and timely action on their own in this setting and were inclined to favor the imposition
of federal standards. Id. at 328-38.
54. For a summary of the state versus federal argumentation, see ROKMS 7-12.
55. For a summary description and comparison of the features of most of the proposed
plans, see id. at 33-96, 272-75.
56. See notes 4, 15, 16 supra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text.
58. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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the differences in substantive law. The draftsmen of the Uniform
Act 9 can expect little in-depth guidance in their arduous work from
the plans already proposed. This is so because in the heat of the
debate over the merits of no-fault, the interstate aspects have been
rather neglected with a tendency too often to seek refuge in the
security blanket of the lex loci delicti as if it were still the rule in this
area, not taking into account the implications for no-fault of the
recent drastic changes in conflicts theory and practice, and without
full consideration of the significant conflicts consequences of the
change of fundamental objectives and methods for automobile loss
reparation inherent in the no-fault concept.
It is important at this point, therefore, to look at the modern
developments in choice of law with a view to determining what con-
flicts approach would best fit the no-fault plan.
THE NEW CONFLICTS AND NO-FAULT
Traditional Conflicts in Full Retreat
Conflicts orthodoxy, which was enshrined in the First
Restatement and the lex loci delicti, one of its main commandments,
have become a rapidly vanishing faith. The early blows dealt to them
by Professors Cook"0 and Lorenzen6 were followed by a widespread
dissatisfaction in the post-war period. The thaw following the "Ice
Age of conflict of laws jurisprudence' '6 2 became a flood in the sixties,
and within a few short years the lex loci delicti as the iron rule of tort
conflicts became moribund. 3 This does not mean that the law of the
59. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
60. W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3-89 (1942).
61. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736
(1924).
62. This is the phrase of Judge Kaufman in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d
553, 557 (2d Cir. 1962).
63. So far, courts in at least 22 jurisdictions have refused to follow the rule. These jurisdic-
tions include New York, California, Illinois, Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia.
WEINTRAUB 234-36 n.36; Note, The Erosion of Lex Loci Delicti: Toward a More Rational
Choice of Tort Law, 5 U. RICHMOND L. REv. 331-34 (1971). A recent Ohio case seems to place
that state also in the column of the reformers. Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio
St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405 (1971). On the other hand, the rule has been reaffirmed in only ten
states, WEINTRAUB 237 n.43, sometimes only upon stare decisis, see, e.g., Landers v. Landers,
153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); McDaniel v. Sin, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965); or
sometimes halfheartedly, see, e.g., Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla.
1967); or sometimes for the lack of an easily administrable alternative, see, e.g., Friday v.
Vol. 1972:331]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
place of the accident is necessarily irrelevant, but that it has been
dethroned as the single applicable connecting factor and that its con-
tinued use must be justified on policy grounds.
While a detailed description of the new theories that have revolu-
tionalized the conflicts rules in the torts field is beyond the scope of
this article, it is necessary to review their fundamental tenets and
methods, albeit in an oversimplified way, before attempting to assess
their implications for the resolution of conflicts in no-fault. Broadly
speaking, the arena of conflicts for torts is presently dominated by
two currents-the revolutionaries, who basically reject the First
Restatement approach and advocate in its place a variety of novel
concepts and methodologies, and the revisionists, who admit many
of the shortcomings of the traditional system but attempt to rectify
them by taking policies into account, particularizing the rules and
introducing flexibility in their application. The variations within each
current are virtually infinite and need not be of particular concern
here. It will suffice, for present purposes to concentrate on two repre-
sentative approaches-the theory of "governmental interests" and
the "most significant relationship" test.
The Theory of Governmental Interests-A Conflicts Revolution
The late Professor Brainerd Currie continues to occupy the center
stage of the revolutionary group. 4 His iconoclasm was so pervasive
that his "governmental interests" system left no room for choice of
law rules in the traditional sense. To fill the resultant vacuum, he
proposed a methodology which sought to determine on an ad hoc
basis whether a given substantive law or rule of the forum state
should apply in a given multi-state situation. This determination was
to be accomplished essentially through a process of construction and
interpretation of the law or rule. If the policy underlying the law or
rule would be advanced by its application in a particular case, and
an appropriate relationship existed between the transaction, the par-
ties or the litigation and the forum state, there was a "governmental
Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966); Abendsch-
ein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969); Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136
S.E.2d 303 (1964). See Juenger 203 n.7.
64. Professor Currie's theory is described and explained in his various writings. See
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS; Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development
in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233 (1963); Currie, The Disinterested Third State,
28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754 (1963).
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interest" and the courts had no choice except to apply the forum's
law. The presence or absence of a comparable governmental interest
in another state was essentially irrelevant. Where only the forum or
only another state was interested, there was a "false conflict," and
the application of the substantive law respectively of the forum or of
the other state made eminent sense. Where, however, both the forum
and another state were interested, there was a "true conflict," and the
forum judge ought to prefer the local over the foreign interest, at least
where no interstate compact or federal law dictated to the contrary. 5
To avoid complete displacement of foreign by domestic law through
overzealous localism, Currie in his later writings admonished the
courts to engage in a moderate and enlightened interpretation of the
governmental interests of their state, and to seek accommodation by
applying the law of another interested state when the local policies
would not be significantly infringed.6 In the infrequent instances
where the forum was a "disinterested state," the court again ought
to apply, faute de mieux, its own local law, at least when it coincided
with that of one of the interested states, or the court might choose
the better law."
The Currie methodology has attracted considerable scholarly sup-
port and even the leading revisionists have been forced to make allow-
ance, in the Second Restatement, for the policies and interests of the
forum state. More importantly, many of the landmark decisions
that ushered in the brave new world of conflicts, especially in the
bellwether states of New York and California, bear the distinct im-
print of governmental-interest analysis. 9
Opposition to the Currie theory, however, has been strong in
Europe and is increasing in the United States. The critics assail its
theoretical foundations, disputing the existence of governmental in-
65. See CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS 183-84; REESE & ROSENBERG 523-24.
66. See CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS 186; REESE & ROSENBERG 523.
67. REESE & ROSENBERG 524; Currie, The Disinterested Third State, supra note 64, at 777-
80.
68. SECOND RESTATEMENT §§ 6(2)(b), (c), (e).
69. See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551,432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Tooker
v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743. A recent ingenious and far reaching use of
governmental interests analysis came in Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 433 F.2d 884 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971), where the court read Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), to require federal courts to apply state conflicts law only in "true
conflict" cases, and disregarded the Louisiana "place of delivery" rule and applied substantive
forum law on the theory that the particular conflict was "false." 433 F.2d at 889-91.
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terests which should be of significance in determining the spatial
application of private law.70 They also contend that, in any event, the
theory is unworkable since such interests are not easily ascertainable,
and no matter how arduous and conscientious the search, the conclu-
sion is bound to be conjectural and subjective, all to the detriment of
the recognized objectives of certainty, uniformity and ease of applica-
tion .7 Even when the search bears fruit, multiple interests may be
discovered, each pulling in a different direction. Finally, the most
effective attacks against Currie's theory focus on his arbitrary se-
lection of the law of the forum to resolve all "true conflicts." This
forum preference is said to be destructive of efforts to provide criteria
for allocation of law-making powers in a rational system of choice
of law and to foster forum-shopping. 7" In fact, in most cases where
the courts use governmental interests analysis, this built-in forum
preference is rejected and an attempt is made to weigh the interests
of the states involved in a more or less neutral fashion-in a manner
reminiscent of the approach of the Second Restatement.74
Another influential conflicts scholar, whose approach parallels
Currie's in a number of ways, is Professor David Cavers. Like Currie,
he believes that the purposes underlying the substantive law are ger-
mane in delineating the ambit of its territorial and personal applica-
70. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 63-64 (1967); REESE & ROSENBERG 571-72; Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of
Laws, in 112 HAGUE COURSES (II) 181-89, 198 (1966); cf. A. VON MEHREN & D, TRAUTMAN,
THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 237 (1965).
71. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 223-25 (1968); Baxter, Choice of Law and
the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18-22 (1963); Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in
Conflicts Law? From Beale to Covers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1966); Evrigenis, Tendances
Doctrinales Actuelles en Droit International Privi, in 118 HAGUE COURSES (II) 313, 362-64
(1966); Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie,
27 U. CI. L. REV. 463, 474-77 (1960); Juenger 206-11; Reese, Recent Developments In Torts
Choice-of-Law Thinking in the United States, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 181, 186-88 (1969);
Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrifi, II AM. J. COMP. L. 632, 663 (1962); Rosenberg, Two
Views on Kell v. Henderson, An Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 459, 464 (1967); Von Mehren, Book Review, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 91, 92-97 (1964). See also
CAVERS 74-75, 108, 135.
72. Evrigenis, supra note 71, at 362.
73. See REESE & ROSENBERG 524-25; Evrigenis, supra note 71, at 365-68; cf. CAVERS 119-
20.
74. See discussion and authorities cited in R. CRAMTON & D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAWS
253 (1968); A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 70, at 64; Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in
Conflicts Law:. supra note 71, at 389; Juenger 208; cf. Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor
Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 845 (1961). For a very recent
and particularly interesting case, see Pryor v. Swarner, 445 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971).
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tion, and he basically goes along with Currie in identifying and resolv-
ing "false conflicts."7 At the same time, he recognizes that the choice
of law should be made in a way to render justice in disputes among
private persons, and therefore, he is not satisfied with the wholesale
application of the lexfori in "true conflict" situations. 7 To take care
of "true conflicts," Cavers has developed certain "principles of pref-
erence"77 which differ from traditional rules in that they take into
account not only the various significant contacts but also the content
of the potentially applicable laws. In the personal injury field, the
Cavers principles evaluate contacts and content with a view to reach-
ing a balance between two contradictory objectives: first, granting the
plaintiff the fullest possible reparations; second, shielding the defen-
dant from excessive liability under laws which should not, in fairness,
be applied against him. Despite the fact that the principles of prefer-
ence actually formulated by Cavers are tentative and fragmentary, 7
they are increasingly referred to by the courts.79
The Revisionist Approaches
The Second Restatement best exemplifies the revisionist position.
In it, the traditional connecting factors-such as the lex loci delicti,
lex loci contractus, lex domicilii and lex rei sitae-often remain, but
only as guides, in the search for the state with the most significant
relationship to the parties and the transaction or occurrence with
regard to the particular issue in dispute. In an effort to reduce the
subjectivity of the determination of the most significant relationship,
the Second Restatement sets up a number of particular presumptions,
usually rebuttable, that the law of a state where a certain combination
of factors is present should apply. Certain general objectives of the
choice of law process are also enumerated, in preferential order, as
aids in the evaluation of the significance of particular contacts. In
addition to such time-honored objectives as the needs of the interstate
and international systems, the protection of the justified expectations
75. CAVERs 72-73.
76. Id. at 73-75, 121.
77. Id. at 75-87, 139-80.
78. For an excellent critique of the Cavers principles, see Evrigenis, supra note 71, at 341-
54.
79. See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Pfau
v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970); Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12,
237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
Vol. 1972:331]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
of the parties, the certainty, predictability and uniformity of results,
and the ease of determination and application of the law chosen-the
Second Restatement, in a major concession to the Currie approach,
recognizes the importance of the policies and interests of the forum
and of other states. 80
In a sense, one cannot but welcome the constructive approach of
the Second Restatement at a time when the demolition of the tradi-
tional system and the continued factionalism among the apostles of
the new creeds have brought conflicts law to the brink of anarchy. It
has, however, been attacked by those who do not want conflicts to
be strait-jacketed into rules, or who consider their present reformula-
tion as misguided or premature.8 ' It has also been claimed that the
Restatement's eclecticism and efforts to accommodate divergent
viewpoints have led to such a dilution of its standards that they have
become amorphous and may mean all things to all people." The
"most significant relationship" test has also been branded as involv-
ing circular reasoning since the significance is the point in question."
Policy Orientation and the Importance of Home-State Law in Mod-
ern Tort Conflicts
Modern conflicts law is still in a state of ferment, and the logoma-
chies go on with the zeal and unreality of medieval theological dispu-
tations. While it is too early to tell which way the new conflicts will
eventually crystallize, if one were to cut through the doctrinal maze,
focus on the practical implications of the modern approaches and
take stock of the results suggested by the commentators or reached
by the courts, certain definite common trends stand out, which are
of particular significance for choice of law in the automobile accident
field.
The modern theories are policy-oriented, in the sense that they
80. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 6(2).
81. See. e.g., CAVERS 29 (describing Currie's view); Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution In
Conflicts Law?, supra note 71, at 388; Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" In
the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1963); Weintraub, The Contracts
Proposals of the Second Restatement ofConflict of Laws-A Critique, 46 IOWA L. REv. 713
(1961); cf. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS 170; Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement
Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 681 (1963).
82. CAVERS 69-72; A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 70, at 67; Ehrenzweig, The Second Con-
flicts Restatement: A Last Appealfor Its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230, 1241 (1965):
cf. Reese, Products Liability and Choice ofLaw: The United States Proposals to the Hague
Conference, 25 VAND. L. REv. 29, 30-31 (1972).
83. CAVERS 207; A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 351, 464, 548 (1962); Juenger 212.
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reject the territorial sovereignty and vested rights dogmas of the First
Restatement, and rely heavily on the purposes sought to be achieved
by the substantive law in delineating its sphere of application.s8 As a
consequence of the renunciation of the geographical test in favor of
a teleological one," the internal objective of the particular substantive
law becomes the most useful guide in determining its external scope.
"Purposes," "policies," "objectives" and "interests" have replaced
the traditional localization concepts, and there has been a reconsider-
ation of the very foundations of the basic conflicts rules. The most
important consequence of this for automobile loss reparations has
been the emergence and predominance of personal, in particular
domiciliary, factors over territorial ones.
Policy analysis shows that the main objectives of tort law are first,
to regulate conduct, particularly to deter or punish undesirable ac-
tions, and second, to provide reparations to those who have suffered
losses attributable to such conduct."6 The conduct-regulation objec-
tive supports a territorial orientation for choice of law since states
normally are concerned with acts, and their effects, within their own
boundaries, regardless of who may be involved. Loss distribution,
however, is of primary concern to the home states of the parties,
because that is usually where they have come from and where they
will eventually return. The state of the accident has, at most, only an
indirect interest in reparations-that is, to the extent that the availa-
bility and size of reparations may deter undesirable conduct through
its punitive effect and may provide a fund for the protection of local
creditors.
When these objectives are particularized and brought to bear
upon automobile accidents, the importance of personal over terri-
torial considerations becomes evident. Whatever the deterrent effect
of liability for negligent driving may be in a vacuum, it is negligible
when considered in the context of the present situation in the United
States. Every state requires negligent drivers to compensate their
victims for their personal injuries and permits owners and drivers to
protect and cover the loss through insurance. Against this back-
84. See CAVERS 93.
85. See Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1214
(1946).
86. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 145, comment c, at 416-17; Juenger 216; Reese, Recent De-
velopments, supra note 71, at 189; Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL
PROB. 137 (1951).
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ground, state laws relating to the modalities of recovery-for exam-
ple, restrictions on who may recover (guest statutes, immunities and
survival statutes) and on what may be recovered (damage limita-
tions)-are recognized to have little, if any, deterrent effect. 7
With compensation looming as so large a factor in automobile
accident liability," the search for the states which are likely to have
the closer connection with the issue of recovery, and the greater claim
for and interest in the application of their law to its determination,
leads to the home states of the parties involved in the accident."
While it may be true that with the increasing mobility of our popula-
tion the relationship linking persons to states is not as permanent and
as profound as it once was,9" it is beyond dispute that, in significance
and durability, it far surpasses any other relationship-especially the
relationship of a person to the state where the accident happens to
occur.9  It is interesting to note that the drift away from territorial
87. See. e.g., KEETON & O'CONNELL 247-49; Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and
Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 373, 375 (1971); Senate D.C.
Hearings 83, 140.
88. KEETON & O'CONNELL 242, 256; Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57
CORNELL L. REV. 315, 333 (1972).
89. The terms "home state" and "domicil" are used interchangeably in the present article
to refer to the locality where the personal and occupational activities of a person are centered.
The concept may not be unambiguous to the point of perfection, but its basic meaning is
generally well understood. See REESE & ROSENBERG 8, 50-51. Professor Cavers, in his princi-
ples of preference, prefers to use "home state," meaning "settled residence," instead of domicil
as a connecting factor in order to avoid the traditional association of domicil with only one
place at a time. CAVERS 140, 154-55 n.21. He is almost promiscuous, however, in the use of
terminology, referring indiscriminately, for example, to "resident," id. at 124, 129, "inhabit-
ant," id. at 135, 148, "citizen," id. at 125, 144, 149, "out-of-stater," id. at 143, 149 n.15, 154,
and "domiciliary," id. at 141-42. Currie labelled domicil "an intolerably elusive factor in
commercial transactions," but recognized that the ambiguity could be largely overcome by
substituting the factual concept of "settled residence" as advocated by Cavers. CURRIE, SE-
LECTED ESSAYS 103-04, n.41. Currie indicated that domicil is not as objectionable in tort cases
as in commercial cases, but still expressed a preference for "residence, carefully defined." Id.
at 141, n.53. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 145(2)(c) refers to both domicil and residence as rele-
vant connecting factors for torts.
90. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 749, 752 (Fla. 1967); CAVERS 135-36;
R. LEFLAR, supra note 71, at 15.
91. The fortuity of the locus of the accident has been underscored in many of the modern
conflicts cases, including in particular the pioneering case of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), where Chief Judge Desmond empha-
sized that
Modern conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject the traveling citizen of this
State to the varying laws of other States through and over which they move. Id. at 39,
172 N.E.2d at 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
The latest major New York case restated this view in no uncertain terms:
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considerations and toward personal ones is not only an American
phenomenon but has affected in some measure recent efforts to unify
or codify torts conflicts in other countries. 2
We rejected the lex loci delictus [sic] rule because it placed controlling reliance upon
one factor totally unrelated to the policies reflected by the ostensibly conflicting laws.
Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 589, 249 N.E.2d 394, 400, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 527
(1969).
In Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965) it was stated:
All of the commentators and all of the cases that end up in disagreement with the
unbending application of the lex loci have a common thread . . . that the place of the
occurrence of an unintentional tort is fortuitous, and it is by mere happenstance that
the lex loci state is concerned at all. . . . They are also dismayed that in this day of
rapid transportation, whether by land or air, that the rights and liabilities of the parties
to each other should vary from hour to hour, or indeed minute to minute as state
boundaries are crossed. Id. at 629, 133 N.W.2d at 414.
In Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967), the court used the following language:
In the present case appellant and appellee were residents of and domiciled in this
state. The automobile trip was initiated here. By fortuitous circumstances the accident
happened on the other side of the Ohio River instead of on this side. The suit was brought
in this state. It would be strange if under Kentucky law the respective rights of the parties
should undergo some metamorphosis at a point on the bridge just before reaching the
Indiana shore. Id. at 260.
See also the testimony of Senator Adlai Stevenson III to the effect that: "If the motorist is
to comply with a new and different set of complex laws everytime he crosses a State line, he
may need a Philadelphia lawyer as a traveling companion." Senate Comm. Hearings 2124.
According to Professor Sedler:
The place where the accident occurs may not be "fortuitous" in the sense that if the
vehicle or vehicles had not been in that particular place at that particular time there
would not have been an accident, but in realistic and practical terms, it is certainly
irrelevant . . . . The fact that state lines exist does not mean that they should be
significant in automobile accident cases . . . The state line as a basis for the solution
of conflicts problems becomes significant only if we make it. We can solve these prob-
lems on the basis of territorialism or we can look at them existentially in light of social,
economic and behavioral realities. We can give maximum weight to the place where an
automobile accident occurred or we can recognize that in this day and age the social
and economic consequences of automobile accidents will be felt in the place where the
parties live. Sedler, The Territorial Imperative-Automobile Accidents and the Signifi-
cance of a State Line, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 394, 410-11 (1971).
92. The Benelux Draft Convention of 1951, embodying a Uniform Private International
Law, originally ratified by Luxembourg, was revised in 1969 and signed by all the Benelux
countries. While the first paragraph of Article 14 of the Convention establishes the lex loci
delicti as the general rule for torts, the second paragraph provides:
However, if the consequences of a wrongful act belong to the legal sphere of a country
other than the one where the act took place, the obligations which result therefrom shall
be determined by the law of that other country.
The text of the Convention and Uniform Law is available in English translation in 18 AM. J.
ComP. L. 420 (1970). The official comments to the Convention illustrate the exception by
referring to the situation where the parties involved in an automobile accident are nationals
and domiciliaries of another state. 41 REV. CRIT. D.I.P. 165, 174 (1952), reprinted in Nadel-
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mann, International Developments in Choice of Law Governing Torts-ntroductory
Remarks, 19 AM. J. CoMP. L. I, 2 (1971).
The Institute of International Law at its Edinburgh Session of 1969 adopted a Resolution
Regarding Torts in Private International Law which uses, in Articles I and 2, a "most closely
connected" test similar to that of the Second Restatement. Article 3, however, establishes
certain special rules relegating members of a family to the law of their common habitual
residence and drivers, owners and passengers to the law of the automobile's registration, See
Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, in 131 HAGUE COURSES (III),
75, 164-66 (1970): Nadelmann, supra, at 5-6.
Perhaps the most important attempt for international unification of automobile torts con-
flicts is represented by the draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents,
approved by the Hague Conference on Private International Law at its Eleventh Session in
October, 1968 and adopted unanimously by all delegations, with the exception of those from
the United States and England which abstained. For the text of the draft convention, see 16
AMt. J. COMP. L. 588-93 (1968). In view of the great importance attributed in Europe to the
values of certainty, uniformity and ease of application, the draft Convention establishes hard
and fast rules, starting with the lex loci delicti rule in Article 3. It is of particular interest to
note, however, that the broad exceptions engrafted upon the rule make frequent use of the
domiciliary contacts of the parties, and the preparatory works reflect the general consensus on
the importance of such contacts. In particular, an earlier draft of the Convention expressly
subjected claims between driver and passengers to the law of their "habitual residence." Cavers,
Contemporary "Conflicts Law, supra, at 168-69 n.88; Loussouarn, La Convention de la Haye,
Sur La Loi Applicable en Matiere d'Accidents de la Circulation Routiere, 96 J. Du DROIT INT'L
5, 8, 15 (1969). In the final text, the law of the place of the automobile's registration became
the focal point of the exceptions, not so much because of a disagreement in fundamentals but
because it is more easily ascertainable, it facilitates insurance planning and settlements, and in
any event, in most instances it does coincide with the habitual residence of the occupants. See
Castel & Crepeau. International Developments in Choice of Law Governing Torts- Views
from Canada, 19 AM. J. CoMP. L. 17, 20 (1971); Cavers, Legislative Choice of Law: Some
European Examples, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 340, 354-59 (1971); Cavers. Contemporary Conflicts
Law. supra, at 168-70; Loussouarn,supra, at 7-8, 15-16; Report ofthe United States Delegation
to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on Private International Law- The Law Applicable
to Traffic Accidents, 8 INT'L LEG. MAT. 785, 801-02 (1969). The Uniform Law Section of the
Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada approved a Uniform
Conflict of Laws (Traffic Accidents) Act based on the Hague Convention which makes greater
use of the parties' habitual residence. See Castel & Crepeau, supra, at 36-38.
The Special Commission, appointed to prepare a draft convention on the law applicable to
products liability for the 1972 Hague Conference, has chosen the "habitual residence" of the
plaintiff as the key conflicts contact. See Reese, supra note 82, at 38-41.
A number of European countries often peg their departures from the lex loci delicti to the
national and/or domiciliary law of the parties. Most noted of these is Article 45 of the new
Civil Code of Portugal, dealing with extracontractual liability, which provides in paragraph
three:
[If the] actor and the victim have the same nationality, or, failing that, have the same
habitual residence and happen to meet in a foreign country, the applicable law shall be
that of the common nationality or common residence.
See Cavers, Legislative Choice of Law, supra, at 353-54. The Swiss Law on Road Traffic of
1958, Art. 85(2)(b), calls for the application of Swiss law to determine the rights of Swiss
domiciliaries injured abroad by Swiss-registered vehicles. See Nadelmann, supra, at 3 n.10.
Under German law, certain automobile injury actions between Germans are governed by
German law even when the place of the wrong is located abroad. Road Traffic Law of 1952
(I.B.G. BP 837) cited in Drion, The Lex Loci Delicti in Retreat, in FESTSCHRIFr FUeR
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From the victim's point of view, his present losses and future
financial needs are best defined and measured in the context of his
home state. He is supposed to be, and frequently is, familiar with its
law, and his plans for accident protection, if any, are made with local
companies, with the expectation that, for better or worse, such law
will be applied. His dependents and most of his creditors, who have
a stake in his finances, are also likely to be local. And, in the last
analysis, it is his home state which may eventually have to provide
public support for him and bear the burden of the obligations which
he can no longer assume."
Since, however, under tort reparations the burden falls on the
alleged wrongdoer, the latter's home state appears to have a commen-
surate protective interest in shielding him from unreasonable liabil-
ity.94 His familiarity with, and planning in accordance with his state's
law, the location of most of his creditors and his continued welfare,
OTTO RIESE 225 (1964). See also KEETON & O'CONNELL 207-09; Kegel, supra note 70, at
194. CAVERS 176 n.59. In England, the House of Lords recently applied English law to decide
the claim of one Englishman against another for injuries suffered in an automobile accident in
Malta, adopting in the process a choice of law approach resembling that of the Second
Restatement. Chaplin v. Boys, [1969] 2 All E.R. 1085. See Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts
Law, supra, at 184-85; Reese, Choice of Law in Tort Cases, 18 Am. J. CoMP. L. 189 (1970).
On the application of the common domiciliary law of the parties, see also Cavers,
Contemporary Conflicts Law, supra, at 183, 186; Kahn-Freund, Delictual Liability and Con-
flict of Laws, in 124 HAGUE COURSES (II) 1, 64-87, 121-28 (1968).
93. "[Il]n the ordinary accident case, the realistic purpose in allowing recovery is to provide
compensation for the victim or his dependents. Since the social and economic consequences of
the accident will be borne in the victim's home state, the only real interest in allowing compen-
sation lies there." Sedler, Symposium: Conflicts of Laws Roundtable, 49 TEX. L. REV. 224,
226 (1971). See also Reese, supra note 82, at 34 n.7, 39.
Section 7(d) of the federal Hart and Moss Bills, notes 10-11 supra, relegates the person
injured by an uninsured automobile to the assigned claim plan of the state in which he resides.
In a recent case involving the Jones Act, the three dissenters elaborated on the Supreme
Court's application of interests analysis in the delineation of the sphere of application of federal
statutes. In an opinion written by Justice Harlan, it was stated:
The only justification that I can see for extending extra-territorially a remedial type
provision like § 688 is that the injured seaman is an individual whose well-being is a
concern of this country. . . . IT]he necessary ingredients for a statutory cause of action
(are]: first, as a matter of statutory construction, is plaintiff within that class of seamen
that Congress intended to cover by statute? .... Where, as in the case before us, the
injured plaintiff has no American ties, the inquiry should be directed toward determining
what jurisdiction is primarily concerned with plaintiff's welfare . . . . Hellenic Lines
Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 313-14, 318 (1970).
See also notes 97, 101-02 infra.
94. Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 564-65, 267 A.2d 854, 855-56 (1970). See CAVERS
146-50, 152, 158; Reese, Recent Developments, supra note 71, at 193-94. See also notes 114-
15 infra.
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as well as that of his insurer, all point toward the application of his
own home state law.
The interest and concern of the state of the accident in the victim's
recovery, when it is not the domiciliary state of any of the parties, is
at best residual and limited. With the deterrence objective no longer
significant, the single basis for the application of its compensatory
law would be to create a fund for the benefit of local creditors, if
any.95
With these considerations in mind, the principal question then is
to resolve the particular dispute in a way that will best accommodate
the policies underlying the laws of the plaintiff's and the defendant's
home states and at the same time do justice between the parties. It
must be recognized that this is quite a difficult task. Whatever its
shortcomings, the lex loci delicti rule, by its own nature, pointed
to a single state as the source of the substantive rules to be applied.
Domicil and residence, however, are personal to the parties, and quite
often more than one home state's law may be applicable. What to
do in that situation has become the major headache of modern torts
conflicts.
In the context of an action by a victim against a tortfeasor, three
main home-state types of situations may arise: first, a situation where
the plaintiff's home state provides compensation which is denied to
him under the defendant's home state law-this is the really hard
case;"0 second, the inverse situation where defendant's home law is
95. The alleged interest of the state of injury for the welfare of its medical creditors and
other persons who aided the injured victim has been blown out of proportion in the choice of
law context, considering the lack of proof of actual legislative concern with this problem, It is
probably Currie who is responsible for the postulation of the existence of such an interest which
is to be taken into account in the process of conflicts resolution. In so doing, he relies upon
Supreme Court decisions in workmen's compensation cases, such as Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S.
408 (1955); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); and Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), which held that such a
state interest may provide a constitutional justification for the application of its laws in a
particular context. CURRIE, SELECTED EsSAYS 145 n.64, 210, 294, 369, 373, 375, 701; Currie,
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 64, at 1237. For an opposing view, see Kegel,
supra note 70, at 90, 192 where it is stated that "[t]he Good Samaritan has to take the injured
party as he finds him, with or without a claim of damages based on the appropriate tort
statute." See also the views of Professor J.H.C. Morris summarized in CAVERs 179 n.62. In
any event, many commentators, including Currie, recognize that such an interest may be
residual and limited. See note 124 infra.
96. See Pryor v. Swarner, 445 F.2d 1272, 1277 (2d Cir. 1971); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439
Pa. 563, 568-69, 267 A.2d 854, 859 (1970) (Roberts, J. dissenting); Sedler, The Territorial
Imperative, supra note 91, at 409 n.67.
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more generous to the victim than plaintiff's-this is a relatively easier
case, since the issue is simply whether the plaintiff should get the
extra benefit (or windfall) of the defendant's personal law; third, a
situation where both parties are domiciliaries of the same state, or
their domiciliary law is the same, in which case the choice under
modern conflicts is not in much dispute.
Since the first situation is the most difficult, it shall be examined
in depth, with reference made to how Currie, Cavers and the Second
Restatement might resolve it. Currie, probably more than anyone
else, hammered upon the irrelevance, in most instances, of territorial
contacts and upon the importance of a state's interest in its people."
The governmental interests theory has thus been attacked as having
created a "personal" law of torts. 8 Under the Currie methodology,
the first situation would present a "true conflict" of state interests
which could not be resolved in any completely satisfactory way. Con-
sequently, if the action were to be brought in one of the domiciliary
states, a court should apply the forum law in preference to that of
the other states, unless the conflicting state policies could be accom-
modated through a moderate and restrained interpretation of the
forum law.99 It is to be noted that the forum law preference built into
the Currie system generally favors the plaintiff, because it is he who
has the litigation initiative."' 0 Plaintiff cannot sue in his home state
as such, however, unless the defendant can be personally served
therein, but he may seek to take advantage of his initiative by avoid-
ing defendant's home state and suing instead either in the state of the
accident or where the insurer may be available under a direct action
97. The importance of the domiciliary contacts of the parties in the determination and
definition of governmental interests permeates the entire Currie work. See CURRIE, SELECTED
ESSAYS 77-176. For specific references to the relevance of the personal contacts, such as
domicil, residence or citizenship, see id. at 85-86, 103, 113, 144, 149, 184, 420, 722.
98. Kegel puts it this way:
The [Currie] assumption that the state is interested primarily in the protection of its
own citizens and for that reason strives to apply its own law, leads, in the parlance of
traditional conflict of laws, to a rather pronounced preference for the personal statute
as opposed to territorial points of contact. Kegel, supra note 70, at 119.
See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Breitel in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 593, 597,
249 N.E.2d 394, 409, 411, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 539, 542-43 (1969).
99. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS 167, 169; REESE & ROSENBERG 523-24.
100. Currie was aware of the forum-shopping possibilities inherent in his methodology but
was not too concerned about them. He suggested that "if the demand for uniformity is subject
to moderation, so must be the distaste for forum shopping." CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS 168-
69.
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statute or, quasi in rem, in the state where the insurance obligation
may be garnished.1"" Assuming these to be essentially disinterested
jurisdictions, if their law should be favorable to the plaintiff and
coincides with that of his home state, the Currie method would call
for its application.' 2 Even where the law of his home state is unfavor-
able to him, the plaintiff may get the benefit of the compensatory
policy of the accident state by making a case for a local interest.0 "
By contrast, the defendant can attempt to use the declaratory judg-
ment route only where personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff is avail-
able. As has already been noted, the judicial adherents of the govern-
mental interests methodology are not willing to indulge in the Currie
forum preference, at least not openly, so that they search instead for
a solution to this "true conflict" situation by a weighing pro-
cess-either by taking into account the other contacts, including the
place of the accident, or by developing additional interests of the
domiciliary states. Thus, they essentially converge toward the Cavers
and the Second Restatement approaches.
When the home states' interests pull in different directions, as in
the first posited situation, Cavers would apparently be willing to
resolve the compensation issue by giving the plaintiff or the defen-
dant, as the case may be, the benefit of the law of the place of the
accident, at least if it occurred within his home state. This is the core
of his first and second proposed principles of preference.' This "en-
lightened territorialism" at the second level of reference is defended
as being fair to the parties and consistent with their expectations,
while also taking into account any regulatory interests of the accident
state as such.0 5
Cavers also emphasizes the significance of the pre-existence of a
relationship, if any, between the parties and focuses on the "seat" of
such relationship as the crucial connecting factor in principles of
preference number four and five, which contain the major exceptions
101. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966); Pryor v.
Swarner, 445 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971). See WEINTRAJB 147-50; Cavers, Cipolla and Conflicts
Justice, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 360, 363-64 (1971).
102. See note 67 supra.
103. See note 95 supra.
104. CAVERS 139, 146. Cavers would apply the higher standard of financial protection of
the state of the accident even where the plaintiff is an out-of-stater, so long as the defendant is
also an out-of-stater. Cf Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 641,
646-47 (1968).
105. CAVERS 139-59.
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to the rules set out in principles one and two.' 0 This view made some
inroads with the courts, as Dym v. Gordon aptly illustrates, 7 but was
dealt a blow in Macy v. Rozbicki 8 and was probably laid to rest, at
least in New York, in Tooker v. Lopez."9 The Cavers position sounds
reasonable enough where the relationship itself is the source of legal
rights and obligations between the parties-for example, in carrier-
passenger and master-servant situations-in which case it may be
more appropriate to choose the applicable law on the basis of rela-
tional or contract-type criteria."0 When it comes to casual or tempo-
rary relationships, however-such as that of guest-host-their relev-
ance is quite questionable on policy grounds;"' and in the family
relationship context, the "seat" is nowhere else but at the parties'
domicil.
The tort provisions in the Second Restatement are still burdened
by the vestiges of conflicts orthodoxy, and section 146 establishes a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the lex loci delicti in personal
injury cases. It is to be noted, however, that this rule is intended to
apply generally to all torts, and it must be understood as implement-
ing in part the deterrent objectives in this area of the law. When the
scope of inquiry is narrowed and the focus is placed on compensatory
legislation, the Second Restatement moves away from the rigidity of
territorialism and demonstrates recognition of the significance of the
personal contacts. More particularly, a number of special sections
relating to the availability and size of compensation are not restricted
by the territorial presumption of section 146, but refer generally to
the state of the most significant relationship" 2 to be chosen under the
omnibus section 145, which includes the domicil and residence of the
parties as major significant contacts. Be that as it may, in the first
posited situation the Second Restatment is likely to lead to the same
choice of law results as the Cavers method. With the domicil or
106. Id. at 166-80.
107. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
108. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
109. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
110. Cavers places these kinds of relationships at the center of his illustrations, but
unfortunately, he does not stop there but carries his analysis over into incidental relationships.
Ill. See Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969);
Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, supra note 71, at 462-63; Trautman, Comments
on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 618 n.1 (1968).
112. SECOND RESTATEMENT §§ 167 (survival of actions), 168 (charitable immunity), 171
(measure of damages), 174 (vicarious liability).
Vol. 1972:331]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
residence of the parties split, and in the absence of a special relation-
ship among them, the territorial contacts remain as the only other
significant factor."'
This brief review of the position of Currie, Cavers and the Second
Restatement on the resolution of the central "true conflict," posited
in the first situation, would be incomplete without reference to a more
drastic result-oriented approach advocated by some scholars and hav-
ing a considerable, if implicit, influence upon the courts, especially
in situations where the rules denying or limiting compensation are
believed to be little more than the "dregs of history." Professor Wein-
traub is probably the leading exponent of a trend to tip the scales in
true conflict cases in favor of the plaintiff and establish a presumption
in favor of distribution rather than concentration of the losses, as-
suming the presence of insurance, except when this would unfairly
surprise the defendant." 4 The solution proposed by Professor Wein-
traub is cast in the form of an alternate reference rule which states
that
[amn actor is liable for his conduct if he is liable under the law of any state
whose interests would be advanced significantly by imposing liability, unless
imposition of liability would unfairly surprise the actor."'
This rule, which bears some resemblance to workmen's compensation
practice, may be difficult to apply, since it does not provide any
guidance in determining what would unfairly surprise the defendant.
What it does, however, is unmistakably establish compensation as the
general principle and insulation from liability as the exception. Wein-
traub's more recent interpretation of the exception would give it
considerable breadth, extending it to all cases where the defendant
had no significant nexus with the pro-compensation state."6
A pro-plaintiff bias appears in some form in the writings of other
113. Cf. id. § 145, comment c, at 416-17; Reese, Recent Developments, supra note 71, at
193.
114. WEINTRAUB 204; Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48
CORNELL L.Q. 215, 238-44 (1963).
115. WEINTRAUB 209. Currie expressed the view that such an alternative reference principle
would have a minimal chance of adoption because it dealt forthrightly with the policy conflict.
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS 707.
It is quite remarkable that the United States delegation at the Hague Conference, with
Professor Reese as thie Rapporteur, recently proposed a pro-plaintiff alternative reference bill
for products liability cases in almost identical language. This proposal, however, was rejected
precisely because of its pro-plaintiff bias. See Reese, supra note 82, at 30-38.
116. WEINTRAUB 248-49, and examples given therein.
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conflicts experts," 7 and it surfaces prominently in two categories of
cases and comments of rather recent vintage: those that opt for the
compensatory rule as the "better law"" 8 and those that find a way
to impose liability when the defendant is insured."9
Turning now to the second posited situation, where the law of
plaintiff's home state is less generous to him than the defendant's, the
plaintiff is not in a strong position to make a claim to the extra
benefit. Assuming that the principal aim of the liability rule in both
states is to compensate the plaintiff rather than punish the defendant,
it is quite appropriate in this situation to have plaintiffs recovery
measured under the standards of his home state regardless of who
happened to injure him. 20 There are those, however, who would give
117. Cavers opened the door to this kind of an approach by condemning "jurisdiction-
selecting" choice of law rules and by advocating consideration of the contents of the potentially
applicable laws in making the final selection. CAVERS 8-10, 84-87: Cavers' principles of prefer-
ence contain a built-in pro-plaintiff stance in that the range of situations where a higher
standard of care or financial protection is applicable, is broader than that for a lower one. A
comparison of principles one and four with principles two and five, respectively, demonstrates
this. Id. at 139-59, 166-80. Cf id. at 127. According to Professor Baade, "the thrust of these
Principles is unabashedly plaintiff-oriented." Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Prog-
ress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEx. L. REV. 141, 162
(1967). See also A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 83, at 555; Juenger 228-29; Rosenberg, Two Views
on Kell v. Henderson, supra note 71, at 464. Professor Reese recognizes that "the great
majority of cases applying the governmental interests analysis approach in the torts area have
reached a result favorable to the plaintiff." Reese, Recent Developments, supra note 71, at 188;
Reese, supra note 82, at 35.
118. Professor Leflar is one of the main supporters of the "better-law" approach. See R.
LEFLAR, supra note 71, at 254-59. See also Juenger 230-35. For a collection of such cases, see
WEINTRAUB 244 n.73.
119. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hertz, 315 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Tooker v. Lopez, 24
N.Y.2d 569, 576-78, 249 N.E.2d 394, 398-99, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 524-27 (1969); Miller v.
Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 19-21, 237 N.E.2d 877, 881-82, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 739-42 (1968). Cf
the views of Professors Rheinstein and Currie in CAVERS 26, 33, 47. Professor Cavers is an
outspoken critic of this trend. Id. at 50, 309; Cavers, The Value of Principled Preferences, 49
TEx. L. REV. 211, 219-20 (1971); Cavers, Conflicts Justice, supra note 101, at 365; Cavers,
Some of Ehrenzweig's Choice-of-Law Generalizations, 18 OKLA. L. Rav. 357, 362-64 (1965).
But see CAVERS 31.
120. Professor Cavers has considered this issue on a number of occasions, but his position
is not entirely free from ambiguity. It appears that he would limit the plaintiff to the measure
of recovery provided by his home state, at least when the accident happened there. See CAVERS
48-49; Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law, supra note 92, at 179-80; Cavers, Comments on
Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 647, 651-52 (1968). But see Cavers, Conflicts Justice,
supra note 101, at 368-72. When the accident happens in defendant's state, however, Cavers is
inclined to let the plaintiff recover under defendant's law on the theory that such law is intended
not only to compensate the injured but also to provide for deterrence and retribution in the
interests of general security. CAVERS 53-54, 143-44. What if, in an accident in a pro-
compensation state, both parties are out-of-staters from different states? Cavers poses but does
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the plaintiff the windfall of the extra compensation under defendant's
law, motivated principally by a pro-compensation bias.'2'
The third situation, where the parties' domiciliary law is the same,
is easier than the other two. In the overwhelming majority of recent
cases that do not follow automatically the lex loci delicti, the courts
have applied the common domiciliary law of the parties to decide
issues of compensation for personal injuries caused by automobiles,
at least when such law is more favorable to the plaintiff than the lex
loci. This is generally consistent with the modern conflicts approaches
of all persuasions. 22 When such law precludes or limits recovery,
however, some courts and commentators strain to choose the more
favorable lex loci or other law on the theory that this would be
not directly answer the question. Id. at 145 n.8. Professor Twerski criticizes the Cavers solution
to the situation where the accident happened in defendant's state, arguing:
[lI]t is hard to see why the state of injury has any interest in providing more liberal
compensation to the out-of-state plaintiff at the expense of its own citizen. Twerski,
supra note 87, at 376.
See also Reese's comments in CAVERS 46. The Private International Law Committee of the
Office of the Revision of the Civil Code of Quebec proposed a rule which focuses squarely on
plaintiff's domiciliary law, whether more or less favorable to him than any other potentially
applicable law, in determining his right to recovery. The text of the rule is as follows:
Extracontractual civil liability is governed by the law of the domicile (habitual residence)
of the plaintiff at the time when the act which caused the damage occurred.
See Castel & Crepeau, supra note 92, at 33. See also the rule proposed for products liability
for adoption by the Hague Conference. Reese, supra note 82, at 38-39.
121. See WEINTRAUB 223-24; Juenger 226; Kay, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 584, 590 (1968); Sedler, The Territorial Imperative, supra note 96, at 409
n.67; Trautman, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson-A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 465,467,
472 (1967); notes 114-15 supra; cf Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
Currie spoke both of a possible "altruistic interest" of the pro-compensation state to protect
whoever may be injured by the negligence of its defendants, whatever the location of the
accident or their home, and of a possible deterrent effect on negligent conduct. See Currie's
comments in CAVERS 33, 47, 53; CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS 488-89, 495. Cf Neumeier v.
Kuehner, 37 App. Div. 2d 70, 72-73, 322 N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (1971).
122. CAVERS 134, 152-53; Cavers, The Value of Principled Preferences, supra note 119, at
217-18; Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law, supra note 92, at 156-57, 160, 182. See also
CAVERS 46 (quoting Reese); Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1251, 1255 (1963); Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, supra note 88, at 327-28;
Trautman, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, supra note 11l, at 618. See also authorities cited in
note 123 infra. Cf Rosenberg, Two Views on K9lI v. Henderson, supra note 71, at 464. For
cases where the more favorable common domiciliary law was applied, see, e.g., Aurora Nat'l
Bank v. Anderson, - Ill. 2d _ 268 N.E.2d 552 (1971); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d
259 (Ky. 1967); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d
173 (Mo. 1969); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Farber v. Smolack, 20
N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222
A.2d 897 (1966); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 957 (1968); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
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consistent with the accident state's interest to protect local creditors
or because of a pro-compensation stance. 23 It appears clear, how-
ever, that such interest of the accident state, if any, is limited and
residual2 4 and does not justify the wholesale application of local law
to the main compensation claims. The basic soundness of the pro-
123. Most of the debate on this point centers around Kell v. Henderson, 26 App. Div. 2d
595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't 1966), a rather obscure, laconic case which never reached
the New York Court of Appeals. What attracted interest to it was that it involved the inverse
fact-law pattern of Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963), the celebrated case that ushered modern tort conflicts into New York. In Kell, the only
contact with New York was that the single-car accident happened there. The parties, members
of Ontario families, commenced their trip in Ontario in a locally-registered car and were only
passing through New York. The case was supposed to provide a clue on whether the new
"grouping of contacts" or "governmental interests" methodology of the New York courts was
to be operated with a plaintiff-protective or home rule preference or in a neutral fashion. The
Kell court found for the plaintiff under New York law disregarding the Ontario guest statute.
Had it not been for the fact that Kell was the mirror image of Babcock, it would surely have
passed unnoticed. The opinion appears to be leaning toward New York law more on traditional
lex loci than on policy grounds. Furthermore, it reflected the views of only two of the five
judges. The third judge concurred principally on a procedural ground, namely that the Ontario
guest statute had not been pleaded in time and that an amendment to the pleadings would have
prejudiced the plaintiff. For an approving view of Kell, see Trautman, Two Views on Kell v.
Henderson, supra note 121, at 472-73. Comparable results on a "better law" theory were
reached in Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968); Zelinger v. State Sand
& Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151
N.W.2d 664 (1967). See also Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
Cavers almost predicted the Kell result. Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent
Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. REV. 1219, 1222-26 (1963). Stressing the
"local creditors" and "deterrent effect" points, he appears to favor the Kell result. See Cavers,
The Value of Principled Preferences, supra note 119, at 218-19; but cf. CAVERS 156-57. Profes-
sor Cavers has also conceded that Kell appears to be in conflict with the criteria set up by Judge
Fuld in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969). Cavers,
Contemporary Conflicts Law, supra note 92, at 160-61, 179, 182-83. On the inconsistency
between Babcock and Kell, see Juenger 225-26; Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson,
supra note 71, at 463. It is interesting to note that Professor Weintraub, one of the leading
pro-compensation advocates, has reservations on the soundness of the Kell result. WEINTRAUB
246-47.
In view of the fact that Kell has served as the rallying point for the pro-compensation group
and undercut the credibility of Babcock's use of the personal law of the parties, it is important
to note that Kell has been put to rest by the same court that decided it. In the case of Arbuthnot
v. Allbright, 35 App. Div. 2d 315, 316 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dep't 1970), which involved essentially
identical facts with Kell, the court unanimously limited Kell to its procedural holding and
upheld the Ontario guest statute defense-on the ground that the mere happening of the
accident in New York is insufficient to support the application of New York law, citing, quite
appropriately, Judge Fuld's concurring opinion in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 585, 249
N.E.2d 394, 403, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 531 (1969). But see Saleem v. Tamm, 67 Misc. 2d 335,
337, 323 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766 (Broome County Ct. 1971).
124. Cf CAVERS 144; CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS 368; Currie's comments in CAVERS 52-
53; WEINTRAUB 219; Twerski, supra note 87, at 376. See also note 95 supra.
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compensation stance is also questionable,' 25 and in fact, the courts
have not hesitated in many instances to apply the common domici-
liary law against the plaintiff.' In conclusion, it is fair to state that
in modern conflicts the common domiciliary law of the parties, what-
ever its content, is of paramount importance in deciding automobile
reparations claims. 127
The Domiciliary Factor in No-Fault
The choice of law problem in automobile accidents has so far been
considered under both the old and the new conflicts theory and prac-
tice only in the context of tort liability. To be sure, the fact that the
insurance of the tortfeasor covered a given liability has sometimes
influenced the courts in favor of selecting the law that imposed liabil-
ity.' In principle, however, automobile insurance has been viewed
only as underwriting the tortfeasor's liability and as bein4 immaterial
to its determination.
The no-fault approach, permeated as it is with a compensation
philosophy and built around insurance rather than relying on old-
125. [W]henever two parties from an immunity, no liability, or limited liability state
are involved in an accident in a "recovery" state-assuming no interest of the recovery
state in implementing any admonitory policy-there is, in reality, a false conflict and
the law of the parties' home state should be applied. Sedler, in Symposium: Conflict of
Laws Roundtable, 49 TEX. L. REV. 224, 226 (1971).
See also Sedler, The Territorial Imperative, supra note 96, at 409 n.67.
126. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 III. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Wartell v. Formusa,
34 III. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Witherspoon v. Salm, 142 Ind. App. 655, 237 N.E.2d
116 (1968), rev'don other grounds, 251 Ind. App. 575, 243 N.E.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Fuerste
v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Schneider v. Schneider, 110 N.H. 70, 260 A.2d 97
(1969); Dow v. Larrabee, 107 N.H. 70, 217 A.2d 506 (1966); Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H.
30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966); Stacy v. Greenberg, 9 N.J. 390, 88 A.2d 619 (1952); DeFoor v.
Lematta, 249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677
(1966); Garza v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. 1965). Cf. James v. Powell, 19
N.Y.2d 249, 225 N.E.2d 741, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1967). See also, Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co.,
342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965).
127. In most of the cases where the common domiciliary law of the parties was applied in
the automobile accident context, see notes 122, 126 supra, the courts used language indicating
that such law was chosen because of the importance of the domiciliary contact as such. See
CAVERS 134, 136, 150-52, 156-57; Sedler, supra note 125, at 226-27; Trautman, Comments on
Reich v. Purcell, supra note I l1.
The Second Restatement goes as far as to create a presumption in favor of the choice of
the common domiciliary law as such to determine issues of tort liability among members of
families, SECOND RE5TATEMENT § 169, and generally refers to such law in many tort loss
reparation contexts. See, e.g., id. § 145, comments d and e, § 156, commentf, § 159, com-
ment b, § 171, comment b. Cf. Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law, supra note 92, at 186.
128. See notes 21, 119 supra.
[Vol. 1972:331
NO-FA ULT INSURANCE
fashioned person-to-persort recovery concepts to distribute the losses
caused by automobiles, is ideally suited to use the teachings of mod-
ern conflicts. Indeed, it is when the substantive law aims at compen-
sation, rather than deterrence or punishment, that the predominance
of the personal over the territorial contacts becomes unquestionable.
It is not without some surprise, therefore, to find that the main
no-fault proposals rely heavily on the lex loci delicti in delineating the
sphere of their application. Only the District of Columbia Plan and
the intrastate provisions of the Massachusetts Plan dispense some no-
fault rights and obligations according to criteria that are reconcilable
with the fundamental teachings of modern conflicts and reflective of
the objectives of no-fault.
The next step, then, is to analyze the interstate features of the
main no-fault plans. When this analysis is completed, the outline of
a totally personal approach to the no-fault conflicts problem will be
drawn, with an explanation of its responsiveness to modern conflicts
learning and its workability.
THE INTERSTATE FEATURES OF THE No-FAULT PLANS
The New York Plans-The Revival of the Lex Loci Delicti
The Stewart Plan. 29  The boldness on the substantive side of the
Stewart Plan-that is, the total abolition of tort liability for automo-
bile accidents based on fault and its replacement with substantial no-
fault benefits for economic loss '-is matched by a straight-forward
choice of law approach. The Plan applies fully to all accidents that
occur within the territorial boundaries of New York and does not
apply at all to out-of-state accidents. 3 ' The domicil of the owner,
driver and injured persons; the seat of the various relationships, where
the automobile was registered, garaged and insured; and all other
connecting factors 'are thus irrelevant and immaterial. All automo-
biles driven in New York, even temporarily or in transit, and wher-
ever registered, must carry no-fault insurance for the benefit of all
persons, including pedestrians, who might be injured in New York,
129. See note 6 supra.
130. Stewart Bill §§ 670-76; Note, The Viability of No-Fault Automobile Insurance in
New York, 17 N.Y.U.L. FORUM 207, 233-35 (1971).
131. Stewart Bill §§ 670, 671, 675; STEWART REPORT 98-99; J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER,
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: THE ROCKEFELLER-STEWART PLAN (1970), reproduced in Senate
Comm. Hearings 798, 805-06.
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excluding, however, the occupants of other automobiles who are to
be covered by the insurers of those automobiles.' When the auto-
mobile is insured, the owner is completely insulated from liability,
and an action lies only against the insurer.' If the automobile in-
volved is uninsured, however, the owner is personally strictly liable
for all injuries to passengers and pedestrians as self-insurer. 13 4
Through modification of the law relating to New York's Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, passengers and
pedestrians who cannot recover from an insurer-because, for
example, the automobile is uninsured, unidentified, unregistered, or
stolen-are entitled to collect from the Corporation in a manner
comparable to an assigned claim plan.135 For out-of-state accidents,
the Stewart Plan would maintain in effect the third-party liability
insurance presently required of automobiles registed in New York.'
The territorialism of the Stewart Plan is directly antithetical to
the personal or domiciliary approach prevalent in modern conflicts
theory in this area. It is indeed ironic that the revival of the moribund
lex loci delicti was proposed for New York, the state which was the
first to make a clean break with the past in the automobile accident
field in Babcock v. Jackson,' and in such other "radical" conflicts
cases as Macey v. Rozbicki'38 and Tooker v. Lopez.'
Why this wholesale regression to the First Restatement? The
Stewart Report makes reference to the "present compulsory insur-
ance law [which] applies to all motor vehicles driven in [New York]
state" and to the general rule that "traffic regulations and motoring
costs are determined by the state in which the motoring takes place,"
and attempts to explain the terditorialism of the Stewart Plan as
being "in keeping with the established pattern."'4 ° But traditional
liability insurance does not relate to who may recover what from
whom, it merely protects the insured against liability. In contrast, no-
fault insurance under the Stewart Plan is in the nature of a repara-
132. Stewart Bill §§ 670-72; STEWART REPORT 84, 85.
133. Stewart Bill §§ 672, 675; STEWART REPORT 84, 85 n.136.
134. Stewart Bill § 671; STEWART REPORT 84, 85.
135. STEWART REPORT 85 n.137. For a description of how the New York system generally
operates in this context, see KEETON & O'CONNELL 113-18.
136. STEWART REPORT 99; N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 311-16 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
137. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E,2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
138. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
139. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
140. STEWART REPORT 98.
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tions system in lieu of tort liability. The fact that under the Stewart
Plan the accident costs are to be internalized and distributed through
insurance is of no significance as such in deciding eligibility for, and
the amount of, reparations. Regardless of whether the proposed New
York no-fault insurance is to be characterized as first-party or strict
liability insurance,'4' no reason is given why recovery should be made
to vary with the locus of the accident. The importance of the domici-
liary factor in first-party insurance has already been explained.1
2
As for traffic regulations and motoring costs, the analogy is at
best misplaced. Traffic regulations, such as speed limits and road
signs, are aimed at conduct. At the very heart of the no-fault system
lies the assumption that accidents are a hazard inherent to motoring
and that reparations should be determined by the victim's needs
rather than by the culpability of the drivers. This is particularly true
under the Stewart Plan because of its total abolition of negligence
liability for accidents within the state. The reference to traffic regula-
tions in support of territorialism for reparations simply makes no
sense. The attempt to analogize accident costs to motoring costs such
as highway and bridge tolls, gasoline taxes and requirements of anti-
pollution devices4 3 is, if anything, even less tenable. These costs do
have a direct relation to the maintenance of a state's road network
dnd the purity of its air, but the main costs of accidents are losses to
people and a state's concern is principally for the welfare of its own
people. 4
141. The Stewart Report suggests that its proposal has elements of both first-party and
strict-liability insurance. It is first-party where the automobile owner claims against his own
insurer, and strict-liability where a passenger, pedestrian or some other party is the claimant.
Id. at 84 n.134. The applicable section of the proposed act itself is entitled "Strict Liabilities."
Stewart Bill § 671.
142. See notes 20-21 supra.
143. STEWART REPORT 98 n.168.
144. There are, however, several clues to the real reason for the territorialism of the Stewart
Plan. First, the footnote to the "traffic regulations" and "motoring costs" text of the Stewart
Report states:
This approach is generally consistent with the territorial basis of modern political
jurisdiction and with the territorial, rather than personal or tribal, nature of modern
systems of civil and criminal law. Id.
It is also, and more significantly, noted in the text:
New York vehicles, when driven outside the state, would be under the accident law
of the state or country in which the accident occurred, just as is now the case. Id. at 99
(emphasis added).
That this is not now the case and that the territorial and vested rights dogmas of the First
Restatement have few adherents has already been demonstrated.
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The principal interstate dysfunctions of the Stewart Plan may be
summarized as follows:
(a) New York domiciliaries injured in other states will not be
entitled to no-fault benefits even when they were driving, riding in or
hit by a New York automobile. Assuming, for example, that an
accident involves one or more New York automobiles in a guest-
statute state, or in any liability state where the driver or drivers were
not at fault, the New York passengers will be left without a remedy
and may become a burden on the state of New York when they
return, despite the fact that the automobiles carried the required no-
fault insurance. This result is indefensible and is not incorporated in
any other major no-fault plan. 45 Note that even where an action
between New Yorkers is brought in an accident state whose courts
follow the modern conflicts approaches, the outcome will probably
be the same since the no-fault domiciliary law of the parties is by its
own terms limited to New York accidents. Thus, the Stewart Plan
would undo the essence of Babcock, Rozbicki and Tooker, the cases
which served as models of the new methodologies for the nation and
which were hailed for the equitable results that they reached.
(b) Out-of-staters driving in New York would be subject to the
New York no-fault strict liabilities toward injured passengers and
pedestrians of their own state whether or not their insurance covers
them. Consequently, if their insurance policy happens not to have a
no-fault rider, they will be personally strictly liable. The reparations
for losses inflicted by out-of-staters on out-of-staters should not be
the business of New York, except possibly for local medical costs.
Imposing the New York no-fault system on unsuspecting owners
and/or drivers of out-of-state automobiles who motor in New York,
however transiently, and exposing them to the personal risk of stag-
gering reparations claims, even when they are not at fault, also goes
beyond any legitimate interest of New York.' For example, an out-
of-stater carrying liability insurance who, while driving carefully in
New York, has a collision with another automobile of his own state,
whose driver is at fault, will be placed in the absurd position of paying
out of his own pocket no-fault benefits to his own passengers while
145. But cf. the provisions of the Columbia Compensation Plan of 1932, see note 159 Infra,
described in Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUMI. L. REv. 784,
810 (1932).
146. For a discussion on this point relating to the Columbia Compensation Plan, cf. A
Symposium, supra note 145, at 822-24.
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he himself can neither recover such benefits nor sue the other driver
in tort!
(c) From the viewpoint of non-domicilaries who are injured in
New York by their co-domicilaries who are at fault, the deprivation
under the Stewart Plan of certain rights, for example damages for
pain and suffering, available to them under their own liability law, is
unnecessarily restrictive. In fact, other states which are not wedded
to the lex loci delicti may refuse to recognize this feature of the
Stewart Plan and proceed to apply their own law in any event." 7
(d) The insurers, and eventually the insurance population, of New
York will have to carry the burden of the losses of out-of-staters who
are injured in or by out-of-state automobiles while being drivers,
passengers or pedestrians in New York in circumstances not covered
by the liability policies of the automobiles involved, even though
neither the victims nor the owners or drivers have paid any insurance
premiums in New York."" The paying insurers are relegated to the
uncertain remedy of recoupment through personal recovery against
the out-of-state owner whose liability insurance may not protect him
in this situation. Even where the out-of-staters are injured in or by
New York automobiles, the question remains why their reparation
rights should be determined under the New York standards, where
the accident happened, rather than under the rules of their home
state, which has the paramount interest in their welfare. The recog-
nized but limited interest of New York to create a fund for local
creditors could be vindicated through a narrowly drafted provision,
without the wholesale application of New York law to the main
claims."9
A no-fault system which bestows benefits upon out-of-staters
under circumstances where they do not bear a fair share of the expen-
ses is particularly unsuitable for "corridor" states such as New Jersey
or states or areas where a substantial proportion of the automobiles
147. In fact they may do so even where only the victim is their domiciliary but the tortfeasor
is a New Yorker, with the result that the latter, if negligent, would be liable in tort in a situation
not covered by his no-fault insurance, for example, a two-car collision in New York. Cf J.
GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 131, at 806.
148. Although out-of-state vehicles would be required to secure no-fault insurance coverage
for operation in New York through a "rider," or additional provision of the liability policy,
there is no adequate procedure for effective enforcement. Stewart Bill § 672; STEWART
REPORT 98 n.169.
149. See notes 95, 124 supra.
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on the highways properly bear out-of-state license plates, such as in
the District of Columbia.
The Gordon Plan. While the chances for the adoption of the
Stewart Plan, in the original version, by the New York legislature are
becoming remote, a new but limited no-fault plan offered in Febru-
ary, 1972, by state Senator Gordon is now in the process of active
consideration and has the support of Governor Rockefeller.' The
Gordon Plan provides for maximum recovery per person for "basic
economic loss" of up to $50,000 for medical expenses, up to $1,000
per month for three years for lost earnings and replacement services,
and up to $25 per day for one year for other expenses.'' Negligence
liability is abolished except for economic loss in excess of "basic
economic loss" and for non-economic loss in the case of a serious
injury as defined by the Plan.' The owner, or the driver if unauthor-
ized, is strictly liable for the "basic economic loss" of all injured
persons other than the occupants of other automobiles,' but insur-
ance coverage discharges the owner's liability; the injured persons are
relegated to an action directly against the insurer.' The insurers are
also required to offer to the owner commensurate first-party type
insurance for injuries which may be suffered by himself or members
of his household. 155
Turning to the interstate features of the Gordon Plan, the territo-
rialism that pervaded the Stewart Plan has been taken over almost
intact. All of the aforementioned strict liability and tort exemption
provisions apply only when the automobile is driven in-state 5  In
out-of-state accidents, the Gordon no-fault is totally inapplicable.
The only significant change made to the Stewart Plan treatment of
this point is the requirement of a clause in the liability insurance
policy to the effect that an automobile driven out-of-state shall be
covered in accordance with the minimum insurance requirements of
the state where driven, 5 ' as if the lex loci delicti still reigned su-
preme!
150. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1972, at 1, cols. 6-7; at 48, cols. 5-8.
151. Gordon Bill §§ 672(2), (3), 674(1).
152. Id. § 673.
153. Id. § 674(1), (2).
154. Id. § 675(1). While the unauthorized driver has been left out of the discharge section,
he can presumably rely on his no-fault insurance, if available, to cover his strict liabilities.
155. Id. § 675(2).
156. Id. §§ 673-74.
157. Id. § 675(4).
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The no-fault features of the Gordon Plan would apply in all in-
state accidents, regardless of the registration of the automobiles
involved, the domicil or residence of the parties and other connecting
factors, much like the Stewart Plan. But in order to reduce the burden'
to be borne by New Yorkers and their insurers for injuries of non-
residents, the Gordon Plan requires all insurers authorized to transact
business in New York to include in all their automobile liability
policies, wherever issued in the United States or Canada, coverage
under the Plan when the automobile is driven in New York and, in
addition, the Plan directly engrafts upon such policies the required
coverage.'58 The criticism addressed to the Stewart Plan is generally
applicable to the present version of the Gordon Plan as well.
With all due respect, it is submitted that the interstate features
of the New York plans are plainly bad. It is indeed unfortunate that
these plans, progressive and trail-blazing on the substantive side,
should be saddled with such antiquated interstate features. There is
time for their reconsideration, however, and it is to be hoped that
New York will get back in the main stream of modern conflicts not
only for its own sake but also because of its force of attraction
throughout the nation.
The Keeton-O'Connell Plan and the Draft Uniform Motor Vehicle
Accident Reparations Act: Territorialism Cum Some Insurance Ben-
efits for Out-of-State Accidents
The Keeton-O'Connell Plan, the very young granddaddy of cur-
rent no-fault, 159 has had a profound influence upon all subsequent
158. Id. § 681. For a similar approach to non-resident in-state driving, see UNIFORM
Acr § 9; notes 176-77 infra and accompanying text.
159. Among the many other proposals aiming at the restructuring of automobile accident
reparations, three deserve special mention. First, the pioneering Columbia Compensation Plan
of 1932, which was closely modelled after workmen's compensation, would have replaced
negligence with strict liability and required compulsory insurance. In a very real sense, the
Columbia plan is the precursor to the modem no-fault proposals. It soon became the center of
intense controversy and was considered in some legislatures, but it never became law anywhere.
Second, Professor Green's "Loss Insurance" proposal revived in the late 1950's the essentials
of the Columbia Plan, more particularly compulsory insurance and liability without fault, but
despite extensive favorable comment, it was not translated into action. Lastly, Professor Ehren-
zweig's "Full Aid Insurance" concept involves a system of voluntary accident insurance paying
benefits without regard to fault and exempting those insured from tort liability. This plan
stimulated much interest but failed to produce any significant changes in the law. These and
other plans are analyzed and discussed extensively in KEETON & O'CONNELL 124-89. See also
ROKES 51-96.
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proposals. The pronounced territorialism of the New York plans and
the draft Uniform Act may be traced, at least in part, to the Keeton-
O'Connell decision to stick to the lex loci delicti, with the single but
important exception that no-fault benefits are made payable to cer-
tain classes of insureds involved in out-of-state accidents.
On the substantive side, the Keeton-O'Connell plan was drafted
on a relatively modest scale. The basic protection insurance compen-
sates injured persons, without regard to fault, for out-of-pocket losses
of up to $10,000 per person, and the insureds are exempt from tort
liability where damages for pain and suffering do not exceed $5,000
and other tort damages do not exceed the $10,000 limit of basic
coverage. In all other cases, the effect of the exemption is to reduce
tort liability by the same amounts. 6
On the interstate side, the locus of the accident under Keeton-
O'Connell is of fundamental importance. In essence, the Plan does
not apply to out-of-state accidents except that certain classes of per-
sons-that is, the named insureds, relatives residing in the insureds'
household and other occupants of insured automobiles-are allowed
to recover basic protection benefits for out-of-state injuries, which
means that they become first-party type claimants under the insur-
ance policy. Other persons, in particular pedestrians and occupants
of out-of-state automobiles, are left out, even if they are domiciliaries
of the no-fault state. The tort exemption is completely inapplicable
to out-of-state accidents regardless of whether, for example, the auto-
mobile or automobiles involved were all insured in the no-fault state,
and whether the injured persons were no-fault state domicilaries.
Thus, even those who recover basic protection benefits in out-of-state
accidents retain the right to sue other no-fault state domicilaries in
tort." '
One would search in vain in the Keeton-O'Connell writings for an
explanation of the substantive reasons for leaving some no-fault dom-
iciliaries injured in out-of-state accidents uncovered by the Plan and,
more importantly, for preserving the tort liability of no-fault domici-
liaries in such accidents even where, for example, all victims are also
160. KEETON & O'CONNELL 5-10, 273-76, 323-24; Keeton & O'Connell, Alternative Paths
Toward Nonfault Automobile Insurance, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 241, 245 (1971); Keeton &
O'Connell, Basic Protection Automobile Insurance, 1967 U. ILL. L. FOMI 400,410-11 (1967).
161. KEETON & O'CONNELL 292, 309 (§ 2.3(b) of the Proposed Act), 317-18 (§ 2.10 of the
Proposed Act), 429-30; Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection Automobile Insurance, supra
note 160, at 426-27.
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no-fault domicilaries. It seems that the out-of-state provisions of
Keeton-O'Connell were formulated in conformity with what was then
supposed to be the best choice of law approach. Thus, their territorial
orientation may be better understood when considered against the
conflicts background of the late fifties and early sixties when the
authors put the plan together. The brief discussion of the interstate
problem in their main work supports this interpretation."' 2
It is thus clear that the authors made their choice out of deference
to now-outdated conflicts doctrine, and with extensive preoccupation
with the full faith and credit aspects, rather than because of the
exigencies of the substantive features of their Plan. While at one point
they seek to justify their territorial orientation by referring to the
possibility of inconsistent results that might ensue if a lex loci delicti
accident state decided not to honor the non-territorial no-fault ap-
proach of a domiciliary state, at another point they seek to force the
accident state, by rejecting renvoi, to apply its own law even where
such state would have preferred to apply the domiciliary law of the
parties. It is also quite possible that the authors were influenced by
the interstate provisions of the workmen's compensation acts. The
reference to the Pacific Employers case and to the full faith and credit
considerations, 3 which were developed principally in workmen's
compensation cases, supports this hypothesis. To be sure, workmen's
compensation acts and no-fault automobile plans start from the same
162. It seems wise not to grant the insured a tort exemption even in the limited group
of cases in which basic protection benefits are payable to victims of out-of-state injuries.
This is so even though in some instances both the insured and the victim will be residents
of the legislating state. If the plan provided that the tort exemption applied to extraterri-
torial injuries and suit were brought in another state in which the accident occurred,
probably that state would not be required to give full faith and credit to the tort exemp-
tion. KEETON & O'CONNELL 292.
The footnote accompanying this text reads as follows:
Cf. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). The
statute could properly extend the tort exemption to tort actions arising from out-of-state
injuries that were brought in the legislating state by a resident of that state. Probably
the exemption could also be extended to tort actions on out-of-state injuries brought in
the legislating state by a resident of the state in which the accident occurred. Despite
the possibility of such extensions, we have chosen to allow the victims of out-of-state
accidents that give rise to claims for basic protection benefits, the right to sue in tort in
the courts of the legislating state. The victim's tort claim is preserved regardless of
whether the state in which the accident occurred, assuming that the tort claim was
brought there, would have applied its law or the law of the legislating state. Id. at n.63.
163. See note 160 supra. See generally Larson, Constitutional Law Conflicts and
Workmen's Compensation, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1037.
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basic premises and share similar reparation philosophies and tech-
niques. While one might persuasively argue for a different conflicts
approach for no-fault than for workmen's compensation, because of
the substantive differences in the patterns of automobile and in-
dustrial accidents and in the nature of the relationships between the
victims and the loss distributees, 4 these are not the most significant
considerations. Workmen's compensation acts came into being dur-
ing the heyday of territorialism, and it is quite natural that their
interstate provisions bear its imprint. Even so, such acts by their own
terms apply in more out-of-state situations than does the Keeton-
O'Connell Plan.' There is no good reason why the no-fault plan
should be burdened with the relics of workmen's compensation choice
of law approaches, which did not work out well in practice'66 and,
moreover, which are not basically consistent with the fundamental
compensatory goals of no-fault.
Turning to the in-state aspects of Keeton-O'Connell, territorial-
ism also leads the authors to extend basic reparation benefits to all
persons injured in the enacting state, whether or not such persons are
insured or even covered by a no-fault insurance policy, without con-
sideration of the domiciliary contacts of the persons and registration
of the automobiles involved." 7 ut-of-staters, however, are liable for
in-state accidents only in tort and only to the injured party.' 5 An
insurer who pays no-fault benefits is entitled only to reimbursement
from the collecting insured, if any, but not to regular subrogation.0 9
This arrangement has, in some situations, the paradoxical effect
of placing out-of-staters in a privileged position over domiciliaries,
164. KEETON & O'CONNELL 6; House Subcomm. Hearings 115; A Symposium, supra note
145, at 805.
165. 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 87, Appendix A, Table 6
(Supp. 1971); SECOND RESTATEMENT Reporter's Note § 181, at 540-41.
166. There is no portion of the compensation act more urgently in need of coordi-
nated state action than the extraterritoriality provision. The present provisions of the
various state acts are in a state of chaos. The reason is that the circumstances under
which a state act covers an out-of-state injury, or even an in-state injury of an out-of-
state employee, vary so drastically from state to state that it is often hopeless to try to
make the "gears mesh." COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION AND REHABILITATION LAW 97 (Program of Suggested State Legislation 1963,
1965).
167. KEETON & O'CONNELL 291, 317 (§ 2.9 of the Proposed Act), 429, 467-68; Keeton &
O'Connell, Basic Protection Automobile Insurance, supra note 160, at 425-26.
168. KEETON & O'CONNELL 291, 402-04.
169. Id. at 403-04. Rights of contribution and indemnity as between tortfeasors (or their
insurers) are preserved. Id. at 326, 462-65.
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at the expense of the insurers and insurance population of the no-fault
state. For example, the out-of-state occupants of an out-of-state auto-
mobile which runs off the road and hits a tree in-state are entitled to
recover basic reparations benefits from an insurance fund to which
neither they nor the owner or driver contributed.17 The same is true
for collisions among out-of-state automobiles. If the out-of-state
driver or drivers were not at fault, this would be the end of the matter.
But even if they were negligent, the out-of-state passengers may be
satisfied with their no-fault recovery and decide not to sue, possibly
in collusion with the owners or drivers, in which case the insurer again
recoups nothing.' In a collision with an in-state automobile, the
results would be essentially the same, insofar as the out-of-staters
rights and liabilities inter sese are concerned. Furthermore, while the
in-stater could not sue the insured owner in tort in such a situation,
the out-of-stater from a liability state which does not follow the lex
loci delicti but instead applies, for example, the common domiciliary
law of the parties, has the option, in lieu of or in addition to recovery
of basic protection benefits, of bringing an action in his own state
against his negligent driver and recovering fully in tort. Out-of-state
pedestrians injured in the no-fault state would also get no-fault pro-
tection without bearing any of the costs.17 2 Serious as these
inequalities may be, however, this is only a part of the story. The real
problem with the territorial approach for no-fault state accidents is
that it brings into the no-fault coverage out-of-staters whose welfare
is not generally the concern of the no-fault state. But the parameters
of the Keeton-O'Connell Plan are rather narrow and, therefore, the
damage that its territorialism may do is limited. The implantation of
such an approach into the more extensive plans, however, is not easily
defensible. This is the case with the New York proposals as it also
is, quite disappointingly, with the latest (fifth) tentative draft of the
Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act.173
The no-fault benefits provided under the Uniform Act are com-
prehensive and comparable in many ways to those in the original
federal Hart Plan. Tort liability is retained for only major harm,"'
170. Id. at 291,317 (§ 2.9 of the Proposed Act), 429; Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection
Automobile Insurance, supra note 160, at 425-26; Kemper, The Basic Protection Plan: Reform
or Regression?, 1967 U. ILL. L. FORUM 458, 467-68 (1967).
171. KEETON & O'CONNELL 403-04.
172. See Kemper, supra note 170, at 468.
173. See note 14 supra.
174. UNIFORM AcT §§ 2-4.
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so that the tort exemption will be complete in most instances. One
of the interesting innovations of the Uniform Act is that benefits are
recoverable primarily from the injured person's insurer, rather than
from the automobile owner's, as is the case in the other major plans.
The insurer of the owner remains only residually obligated to pay.'
This underscores the first-party nature of the recovery and one would
have expected the Uniform Act, therefore, to have been particularly
responsive to domiciliary considerations in framing its interstate pro-
visions. Instead, the Uniform Act is fundamentally territorial, and its
approach may be classified somewhere between that of the New York
and the Keeton-O'Connell plans.
The Uniform Act extends benefits out-of-state, much like
Keeton-O'Connell does, by providing basic protection for out-of-
state injuries of the insured, relatives and minors residing in his
household, and occupants of the insured automobile.' While this is
an improvement over the New York total territorial orientation for
out-of-state injuries, it is subject, however, to the same general criti-
cisms, because of its limited scope, as is the Keeton-O'Connell Plan.
For in-state injuries, the Uniform Act also follows Keeton-
O'Connell in making benefits available to all injured persons,
including out-of-staters. But, in an attempt to rectify the inbalance
in the distribution of losses between in-state and out-of-state insurers,
it engrafts by legislative fiat a no-fault benefits obligation upon all
out-of-state liability insurance policies, when the automobile is driven
in-state, however transiently or temporarily.' The constitutional va-
lidity of such an imposition of liability beyond the terms of the insur-
ance contract upon out-of-state insurers dealing with out-of-state
policy-holders merely because the automobile may be driven in-state,
however, is not entirely clear.' Therefore, the Uniform Act seeks to
175. Id. § 22.
176. Id. §§ I(c), 12.
177. Id. § 9, which reads in part:
Every policy or contract of liability insurance covering the maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle shall include basic reparation benefits in accordance with this Act while
the vehicle is maintained or used in this State regardless of any provision to the contrary
in the policy. An insurer authorized to transact business in this State, or transacting
business in this State, may not exclude coverage of basic reparation benefits in accord-
ance with this Act in any policy or contract of liability insurance covering the mainte-
nance or use of a motor vehicle when the vehicle is maintained or used in this State.
178. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930). See Senate D.C. Hearings 494. The majority opinion in Watson and such cases as Clay
v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) would lend support to the constitutionality of such
legislation. See also CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYs 214-42; Senate D.C. Hearings 198.
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reinforce this no-fault graft through a second provision which rests
on a more solid constitutional ground179-namely, a prohibition
against the exclusion of basic reparation benefits from any and all
liability insurance policies written anywhere by insurers authorized to
transact business in the state. Assuming that the Uniform Act is
adopted in a few of the major states, this compulsion is likely to be
quite effective. The insurance plexus of the Uniform Act is completed
by a requirement, similar to that under New York's compulsory
liability insurance law,' that all automobiles operated in the state,
however transiently or temporarily, and whether or not required to
be registered in the state, should carry no-fault insurance.', 1
On the tort exemption side, the Uniform Act conforms to the
Keeton-O'Connell pattern by not extending the exemption to out-of-
state injuries, but departs from Keeton-O'Connell and aligns itself
with the Stewart Plan by granting a full exemption to all persons
causing in-state injuries.' The Stewart Plan would penalize the own-
ers or drivers of automobiles causing such injuries who fail to obtain
the required insurance, by depriving them of no-fault benefits and,
more importantly, by holding them personally liable without fault as
self-insurers to reimburse the insurers who pay benefits to injured
passengers and pedestrians.8 3 The Uniform Act, however, merely
deducts from their own recovery the sum of $500 for each year of
continuous non-compliance and imposes no reimbursement liability
on them for payments made by insurers to others. 4 The Uniform Act
apparently expects to produce compliance with its insurance require-
ments through the exercise of state power over insurers and insurance
policies and through criminal penalties against non-complying auto-
mobile owners and operators.8 5
As with the New York and the Keeton-O'Connell Plans, one of
the major problems with the Uniform Act is that it seeks to impose
179. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Senate D.C.
Hearings 198, 491.
180. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 310-31 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
181. UNIFORM ACT §§ 6, 7. The constitutionality of imposing the insurance obligation
directly upon the owner or driver of an operated car is apparently clear. Senate D.C. Hearings
at 490-92. But see id. at 188, 198, 490.
182. Id. § 2. Cf. Stewart Bill § 672; KEETON & O'CONNELL 323-25 (§§ 4.1-.2 of the Pro-
posed Act).
183. Stewart Bill § 671(4)(a).
184. UNIFORM ACT §§ 5, 23.
185. Id. § 40.
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the entire no-fault system upon out-of-staters who suffer injuries in-
state. This is contrary to the fundamental premise of modern conflicts
that the domiciliary state of injured persons has the primary concern
for their long-term welfare. At the present time, it is not known why
the drafters of the Uniform Act decided to include out-of-staters
willy-nilly in the no-fault plan, especially with regard to their rela-
tions to other out-of-staters.
Since we are dealing with a Uniform Act, presumably a modern
and desirable piece of legislation, it might be supposed that the over-
extension of the no-fault plan for in-state injuries reflects an intention
to apply the Act to the maximum number of situations in a way
comparable, for example, to that of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 8' This kind of supremacy intent, especially questionable in the
tort field, is, however, negated by the underextension of the Uniform
Act coverage for out-of-state accidents.
The Massachusetts Plan
The Massachusetts Plan,"'7 generally patterned after Keeton-
O'Connell, is quite modest in dimension, but it enjoys the distinction
of having been the first plan enacted in the United States, as of
January 1, 1971. It is already serving as a pilot project for testing the
merits of the no-fault approach. Under this Plan, no-fault recovery
is made available, through compulsory insurance, for medical expen-
ses, lost wages and expenses for replacement services up to a total
amount of $2,000 per person. A commensurate exemption protects
owners and drivers of insured automobiles from tort liability to those
injured persons who are entitled to recover no-fault benefits.'
For out-of-state injuries, Massachusetts generally follows
Keeton-O'Connell, with an important modification. In addition to
the insureds and members of their households and to the occupants
of an insured automobile, pedestrians who are residents of Massachu-
setts, a class excluded by Keeton-O'Connell, are entitled to no-fault
186. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105(1).
187. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34A, D, M, N (Supp. 1971); as amended by id. § 34o.
188. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1971); Kenney & McCarthy, "No-Fault"
in Massachusetts: Chapter 670, Acts of 1970, A Synopsis and Analysis, 55 MASS. L.Q. 23, 38-
41 (1970); Note, The Massachusetts "No-Fault" Automobile Insurance Law: An Analysis and
Proposed Revision, 8 HARV. J. LEGIS. 455, 459, 483-89 (1971); House Subcomm. Hearings
1186-90.
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benefits for injuries inflicted on them by an insured automobile any-
where in the United States or Canada."9 With these exceptions, the
Plan does not apply to out-of-state accidents. In particular, tort lia-
bility for out-of-state accidents is left untouched, even where no-fault
benefits are recoverable-so that, for example, a Massachusetts or
out-of-state injured party, or his insurer through subrogation, may
bring tort actions against Massachusetts insureds in all cases of out-
of-state accidents. 90
The Massachusetts treatment of in-state accidents is significantly
different than under the Keeton-O'Connell and the New York Plans.
No-fault benefits are payable only to those who are actually covered
by no-fault policies or protected by the assigned claims plan-that is
exactly the same classes of persons who recover benefits in out-of-
state accidents. 9' The tort exemption is correspondingly limited and
available solely to owners and drivers of insured automobiles in suits
by no-fault beneficiaries."' The net effect of these provisions for in-
state accidents is quite clear. Out-of-staters generally are not covered
by the Plan on both the benefit and responsibility sides, and are
relegated to the traditional tort liability rules except as occupants of
insured automobiles, when they are entitled only to a no-fault claim,
or as drivers of such automobiles, when they are given the protection
of the tort exemption. The territorial and personal coverage provi-
sions of the Massachusetts Plan for in-state accidents are likely to
bring within its coverage most Massachusetts people in most situa-
tions regardless of the locus delicti. Massachusetts people are ex-
cluded only as passengers of out-of-state automobiles and as owners
189. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34A (Supp. 1971). This conclusion is not mandated by
the language of the statute. Indeed, that language can be and has been read to limit no-fault
coverage to accidents within the commonwealth only. See Kenney & McCarthy, supra note
188, at 24-26. However, the Massachusetts Basic Liability Form, approved by the Commis-
sioner of Insurance, has adopted a broader interpretation and extended coverage to no-fault
insureds and resident pedestrians injured anywhere within the United States or Canada; this
appears to be a reasonable interpretation of the statute. See House Subcomm. Hearings 1154,
1156-57, 1165-67, 1187; Alternative Paths, supra note 158, at 251 n.48; Note, supra note 188,
at 479-82.
190. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1971); Kenney & McCarthy, supra note 188,
at 41, 45, 46; Note, supra note 188, at 483-84, 488, 498-500; House Subcomm. Hearings 1188.
191. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 90, §§ 34A, N (Supp. 1971); Kenney & McCarthy, supra note
188, at 26-29; Note, supra note 188, at 466-70. See text accompanying note 189 supra.
192. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 3M (Supp. 1971); House Subcomm. Hearings 133-34,
1188-89, 1201; Kenney & McCarthy, supra note 188, at 38-41; Note, supra note 188, at 483-
84.
Vol. 1972:331]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
or drivers of uninsured automobiles. Conversely, out-of-staters are in
most instances left out of the Plan.
The Massachusetts Plan has the seed of a promising approach,
which is in harmony with the policy analysis of modern conflicts.
Personalizing the no-fault benefits by extending them mostly to Mas-
sachusetts people, whatever the locus of the accident; generally
excluding out-of-staters, even where the accident occurred in Massa-
chusetts; and retaining the territorial factor, at least in part, in deline-
ating the scope of the tort exemption, may reflect the Massachusetts
conception of no-fault as more of an insurance system than a compre-
hensive reparations scheme-thereby justifying Massachusetts' mak-
ing the benefits available only to those who pay for them as a group.
The fact remains, however, that Massachusetts decided to provide
insurance protection on the basis of personal considerations and, even
for the tort exemption, it tempered territorialism with some personal-
ism.
The Florida and California Plans-Following the Lead of Massachu-
setts
A plan very similar in structure and approach to that of Massa-
chusetts became effective in Florida on January 1, 1972.'1 The Flor-
ida Plan is more advanced than the Massachusetts one in that the
amount of no-fault benefits is higher ($5,000);111 the insurance is more
of the first-party kind with the burden being borne more often by the
injured party's, rather than the owner's, insurer;' and the owner who
fails to obtain insurance as required is liable as self-insurer for the
no-fault benefits. 96
On the interstate side, the Florida Plan follows essentially the
Massachusetts approach with substantial limitations on the extrater-
ritoriality of benefits. Such benefits are recoverable only by the
insured owner or a relative domiciled in the owner's household who
is not an owner of an insurable automobile when injured as occupant
of the automobile. 9 ' The tort exemption is available only for in-state
injuries and only to the extent that no-fault benefits are payable,'
193. See note 4 supra.
194. FLA. GEN. LAWS, ch. 71-252, § 7(1) (1971).
195. See, e.g., id. §§ 7(4)(d)(3) & (d)(4).
196. Id. § 4(4).
197. Id. §§ 7(4)(d)(2) & (3).
198. Id. § 8(1).
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with an interesting exception. The bar to claims for pain and suffering
when no-fault benefits for medicals do not exceed $1,000 is apparently
portable out-of-state. 199 But since only certain classes of relatives may
recover such benefits in out-of-state accidents, this exception is not
of practical significance. The in-state accident features of the Florida
Plan generally parallel those of Massachusetts2 9 and need not be
discussed separately.
The latest no-fault plan proposed for California represents a
blend of the Keeton-O'Connell and the Massachusetts approaches
both on substance and on the sphere of application. No-fault benefits
are recoverable up to $10,000 per person, and there is a commensur-
ate tort exemption.2"' Pain and suffering damages are barred unless
the medicals exceed $1,000, or the injury is serious, in which case they
may be claimed in tort.2 2 An optional clause to cover some pain and
suffering on a no-fault basis is required to be offered by the in-
surer.
203
No-fault benefits are payable for extraterritorial injuries suffered
by the insured owner, spouse or relatives residing in the household in
any automobile accident, and by the occupants of, and pedestrians
struck by, the insured automobile.2 4 If the automobile is uninsured,
however, only the spouse, relatives and occupants can claim benefits
from the assigned claims plan. 25 The owner is generally excluded,2
and the pedestrians are excluded when the accident happened out-of-
state. 2 1 In the case of in-state accidents, all enumerated persons are
entitled to no-fault benefits through the applicable insurance or the
assigned claims plan, including pedestrians as well as resident occu-
pants of out-of-state automobiles. 29 The tort exemption applies only
in-state and only to the extent of the availability of no-fault
benefits. 20 For example, the exemption does not apply in actions by
199. Id. § 8(2).
200. Id. §§ 7(4)(d)(4), 8(l) and 11.
201. Bill A.B. 1505, Motor Vehicle Basic Loss Insurance Act §§ 11901-2, 11951(b) (com-
monly known as the Fenton Bill). This bill had not been as yet enacted, and the chances of its
adoption appear slim.
202. Id. § 11951(a).
203. Id. § 11921(c).
204. Id. § 11904.
205. Id. §§ 11905, 11968.
206. Id. § 11907(b).
207. Id. §§ 11905, 11968.
208. Id. § 11968.
209. Id. § 11950.
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out-of-state motorists against the no-fault insureds. Except for the
fact that benefits are payable to larger classes of injured persons,
possibly under a Keeton-O'Connell influence, and that the interstate
provisions have been drafted very carefully and with sophistication,
the California Plan does not materially differ from that of Massachu-
setts insofar as interstate application is concerned.
The Delaware Plan- The Emphasis Is on Insurance
Delaware adopted a no-fault plan, as of January 1, 1972,11 quite
simple in its substantive provisions but silent on its territorial scope.
This opens up some intriguing possibilities. The Delaware Plan re-
quires all Delaware automobiles to carry no-fault insurance providing
substantial no-fault benefits: $10,000 per person for medical, funeral
and replacement services expenses and for loss of earnings. t Such
benefits are recoverable by occupants of the insured automobile and
pedestrians struck by it, but not by occupants of other automobiles.,'
The injured party may not sue a tortfeasor for the amount of benefits
recoverable under an applicable policy, 13 but the paying insurer is
subrogated pro tanto to the tort claim.2 14
What does this mean on the interstate side? Unless there are some
hidden territorial limitations implied, the Delaware system is rather
clear. Tort liability is generally unaffected;"' presumably it is to be
governed by the applicable choice of law rules or principles. But,
regardless of fault, all occupants and pedestrians injured in or by the
insured automobile are entitled to claim these substantial no-fault
benefits on an insurance basis-apparently regardless of where the
accident occurred and of all other connecting factors. This approach
is quite consistent with a view of no-fault benefits as being genuinely
of the first-party type, similar to medical benefits presently available
under liability policies, with an extended range of coverage. It is also
210. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 2118 (1970). The Delaware Plan resembles, in its main
features, the "Guaranteed Protection Plan" proposed by the American Mutual Insurance
Alliance. See ROKEs 76-77. The emphasis on expanded first-party type coverage without the
abolition of tort liability is also typical of most Canadian plans. O'Donnell, Automobile Insur-
ance-The Canadian Experience, 11 FOR THE DEFENSE 67-81 (1970).
211. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 2118(a)(2).
212. Id. § 2118(a)(2)(A).
213. Id. § 2118(g).
214. Id. § 2118(0.
215. The injured party recovers his losses in full from the owner in tort and from the latter's
insurer in no-fault.
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to be noted that the Delaware Plan does not hold the uninsured owner
as a no-fault self-insurer; it seeks to enforce the insurance obligation
only through criminal penalties." 8 The Delaware Plan's generosity
toward all victims of all accidents is to be borne, however, solely by
the Delaware automobile owners. However, other states may not
wish to carry their altruism to that extent. In addition, the retention,
in essence, of tort liability not only gives no protection to the no-fault
insureds but also does not substantially contribute to the reduction
of tort litigation which is supposedly one of the aims of no-fault.
From a choice of law point of view, however, one can have no
quarrel with the Delaware Plan. Assuming a proper concern by Dela-
ware for some losses of all victims of Delaware automobiles, and a
willingness to leave the tort system otherwise intact, the extended
insurance coverage is quite reasonable and appropriate, and there is
no undue interference with the sphere of application of the tort law.
The District of Columbia Plan-A Long Step Into Personalism
In November, 1970, the District of Columbia Council recom-
mended "that the Congress consider providing a no-fault insurance
system for the District." In response to this recommendation, Sena-
tors Stevenson and Hart introduced in July, 1971, the "District of
Columbia Automobile Insurance Reform Act," 1 7 a substantial piece
of legislation patterned essentially upon the original federal Hart bill.
Under the D.C. Act, no-fault benefits cover all medical expenses,
funeral expenses up to $1,000, and lost earnings of the insured, pas-
sengers and pedestrians up to $54,000.218 The tort exemption is avail-
able in all situations where the injured parties are eligible to receive
no-fault benefits and protects the tortfeasor up to the amount of such
benefits. The tort action is maintained, however, for excess net
loss-that is, for excess loss falling within the no-fault recovery cate-
gories.219 Pain and suffering damages are not recoverable in tort, with
certain exceptions.Y22
What makes the D.C. Act particularly interesting, for present
purposes, is its detailed treatment of the interstate accident problem
216. Id. § 2118(j).
217. The prospects for the eventual adoption of a no-fault bill for the District of Columbia
appear excellent. Senate Comm. Hearings 2123, 2136.
218. D.C. Act §§ 5(a), (b).
219. Id. § 8(a).
220. Id. § 8(c).
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and its greater reliance upon personal rather than territorial
considerations. Reference to the various categories of persons af-
fected is the best way to summarize these interstate provisions.",1
Owners and Operators. Owners and operators of automobiles
registered, or required to be registered, in the District must carry a
package of no-fault and residual liability insurance.22 Irrespective of
whether the accident occurred within or without the District, owners
and operators of automobiles so insured are immune from tort
liability to the extent that no-fault benefits are payable to injured
persons.21 3The Act is unique in making the tort exemption portable
extra-territorially.
Owners of uninsured automobiles which were required to be in-
sured are subject to criminal penalties,24 the tort exemption is una-
vailable to them,22 they are strictly liable for no-fault benefits as self-
insurers,2 8 and they are disqualified from receiving no-fault benefits
when involved in an accident.227 Operators of such automobiles are
similarly treated except that their disqualification as claimants de-
pends upon whether they had reason to believe that the automobile
was uninsured. 28 Owners of insured automobiles are entitled to re-
ceive no-fault benefits for injuries suffered while riding in or struck
by any automobile.2
221. For a discussion of some of the interstate problems faced by the drafters of the D.C.
Act, see the testimony of Senator Adlai Stevenson III, Senate Comm. Hearings 2124, 2128,
2136.
222. D.C. Act §§ 3(b), 4, 5. Non-residents are required to register in the District of Colum-
bia in accordance with registration provisions applicable to District residents in the non-
resident's jurisdiction. Alternatively, registration is governed by any existing reciprocity agree-
ment reached between the District and the non-resident's jurisdiction. Reciprocity agreements
often require registration only after the non-resident's current motor vehicle license has expired.
Exempted from registration provisions are such persons as Senators, Representatives, staff
members and presidential appointees in the executive branch who are registered at their resi-
dence or place of election or appointment. D.C. CODE ENCvCL. ANN. § 40-303(a) (1967). In
the House, Representative Abner Mikva introduced a no-fault insurance bill in July, 1971,
which would require such insurance (usually in the form of riders on present policies) for all
who drive in Washington, D.C., regardless of residence or the length of time spent in the
District. See 117 CONG. REc. E10839-40 (daily ed., Oct. 13, 1971).
223. D.C. Act § 8(a).
224. Id. § 15 (guilty of a misdemeanor with fine up to $1000 or imprisonment not exceeding
one year or both).
225. Id. § 12(c).
226. Id. § 12(e)(2)(A).
227. Id. § 10(e)(2)(A).
228. Id. § 10(e)(2)(B).
229. Id. § 5(a).
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Occupants. Persons riding in an insured automobile as passen-
gers or operators are entitled to receive no-fault benefits whatever the
locus of the accident.?0 The tort exemption shielding owners and
operators of insured automobiles limits the occupants' residual tort
claims only to such net loss as exceeds the policy limits and to pain
and suffering in certain exceptional cases.2 1 The insured occupants,
however, retain any tort claims that they may have against negligent
drivers of other automobiles which were uninsured, subject to the pro
tanto subrogation rights of insurers who paid no-fault benefits to
them. 2 The tort claims of occupants, and of pedestrians as well, are
curtailed under a provision of the D.C. Act which bars recovery for
pain and suffering in all cases except death, and serious injury but
even then recovery may not exceed $25,000 per claimant per tort. 3
By its own terms, this limitation applies only to tort actions governed
by the law of the District, presumably under the choice of law rules
of the District.
Occupants of uninsured automobiles which were required to be
insured are given the right to recover no-fault benefits from an
assigned claims plan, but only if no first or third party automobile
insurance benefits are recoverable elsewhere for the injury.24 It
would appear that the assigned claims protection is available regard-
less of where the accident took place.25 Occupants of uninsured
automobiles which were not required to be insured are not affected
by the D.C. Act, except again for the pain and suffering limitations,
if applicable.
Pedestrians. When it comes to pedestrians, the D.C. Act reverts
to a territorial approach. Only pedestrians injured within the bounda-
ries of the District are entitled to recover no-fault benefits from the
insurer of the injuring automobile or under the assigned claims plan,
as the case may be, and are subjected to the Act's limitations on tort
recovery in a manner similar to that for automobile occupants.2
Pedestrians injured in out-of-state accidents are not affected, with the
possible exception of the pain and suffering limitations when, under
230. Id. § 5(a); 117 CONG. REC. S11679 (daily ed. July 21, 1971).
231. D.C. Act §§ 8(a), (c).
232. Id. §§ 8(a), (b).
233. Id. § 8(c).
234. Id. §§ 10(d), (e).
235. Id. § 10(d).
236. Id. §§ 5(a), 8; 117 CoNG. REc. S11679 (daily ed. July 21, 1971).
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the District conflicts rules, District tort law is applicable.
Fundamentally, the applicability of the D.C. Act hinges upon the
registration, or required registration, of the automobile or automo-
biles involved in the accident. In accidents where a single District
automobile and its occupants are involved, the Act applies in its
entirety whatever the locus of the accident. When pedestrians are
struck by a District automobile, however, the Act applies only if the
accident occurred in the District. Conversely, the owners and occu-
pants of out-of-state automobiles in single car accidents remain out-
side the ambit of the Act, and the same is true for pedestrians injured
by them, irrespective of the place of the accident. Where two or more
District, or two or more out-of-state, automobiles are involved in an
accident inter sese, the result is the same-that is, the Act covers the
former, but not the latter with the same wrinkle on pedestrian claims.
The more difficult case is where a District automobile collides
with an out-of-state automobile. Whatever the locus of the accident,
the occuparits of the District automobile are entitled to recover no-
fault benefits under the D.C. Act as if the Act were the "law of the
flag," but the occupants of the out-of-state automobiles are relegated
to their tort claims, whatever they may be. The owner of the District
automobile, however, remains potentially liable in tort to the occu-
pants of the out-of-state automobile because such occupants are not
within the classes protected by the no-fault features of his insurance
policy."7 On the other hand, the owner-driver of the out-of-state
uninsured automobile is completely unaffected by the Act and re-
mains potentially liable in tort also to the occupants of the District
automobile or to their no-fault insurers as subrogees. 38 Pedestrians
come within the no-fault provisions of the Act only if they are injured
by the District automobile in the District, otherwise they may sue
only in tort.
The old-fashioned treatment of pedestrians should not obscure the
fact that the D.C. Act goes a long way in pegging the law applicable
to automobile accidents upon personal, rather than territorial, con-
siderations. While the Act does not refer to domicil as such, the
combined effect of making both the insurance and the tort exemption
features follow out-of-state the insured automobile and its owners
and occupants and of imposing the insurance obligation on automo-
237. D.C. Act §§ 5(c), 8(a).
238. Id. §§ 8(a), (b); 117 CONG. REC. S 11679 (daily ed., July 21, 1971).
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biles registered or required to be registered in the District and
excluding out-of-state automobiles, 239 is to make the Act applicable
to determine the rights and responsibilities of most District domicili-
aries, with the partial exception of pedestrians, for accidents any-
where in the United States and Canada. Conversely, the Act is mostly
inapplicable to non-domiciliaries because, as a practical matter,
automobiles are generally registered or required to be registered at
the domicil of their owners and their occupants tend to be domicili-
aries of the same state.21
The District of Columbia Plan points the way to the moderniza-
tion of the interstate features of no-fault.
THE MERITS OF THE TOTAL PERSONAL APPROACH FOR NO-FAULT
AND How IT CAN BE MADE TO WORK
It is quite important at this juncture to consider whether there are
any reasons, doctrinal or practical, why the personal approach should
not be given full sway in the no-fault automobile loss reparations
field, sweeping away the last vestiges of territorialism. Anticipating
the conclusion, it would appear that a totally personal no-fault system
is more consistent with the teachings of modern conflicts than a
territorial or any other available system, and that the practical prob-
lems of its implementation are solvable through appropriate modifi-
cation of the insurance and tort exemption provisions of the plan.
Whatever the differences among the modern conflicts approaches
239. On Oct. 12, 1971, Representative Mikva introduced in the House a modified version
of the D.C. Act, H.R. 11183, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), which would significantly alter the
regime applicable to in-state accidents. See 117 CONG. Rac. E10839-40 (daily ed. Oct. 13,
1971). Under section 4 of the Mikva bill, out-of-staters driving in the District must carry no-
fault insurance coverage under the D.C. Plan. If they fail to do so, they are to be personally;
subject to the D.C. Plan obligations under section 1 (c). The District of Columbia is unique in
the United States in that over 40% of automobile accidents in its territory involve out-of-state
automobiles. A major proportion of such automobiles belong to persons who work in the
District but commute to the suburbs in Maryland and Virginia. It was felt appropriate to bring
these persons, as well as the many tourists, within the D.C. Plan because otherwise the antici-
pated premium savings and litigation reduction for the D.C. motorists might not have material-
ized. See Senate D.C. Hearings 73, 78, 142, 146, 150-51, 192, 206, 211-12, 214. While this
increased territorialization is a step in the wrong direction from the conflicts viewpoint, it is
understandable in light of the special situation of the District. Furthermore, reliance on the lex
loci in mixed domicil cases of accidents in the no-fault state is probably less objectionable than
its use in any other context, especially where one wishes to apply the no-fault system in an
expansive way.
240. See discussion of registration requirements, note 222 supra; cf. the provisions of the
Hague Convention, note 92 supra.
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on the theoretical level, there appears to be a common core of agree-
ment on certain basic objectives which, in the no-fault context, may
be put in the form of two propositions. First, each victim should
ideally be able to receive the full benefit of the reparations law of his
home state regardless of the place of the accident. 2 1 Under tradi-
tional tort liability, however, the victim recovers from the tortfeasor,
and always subjecting the tortfeasor to the personal law of the victim
presents obvious problems of unfairness.242 Indeed, this has been the
central problem of modern conflicts and of the domiciliary approach
in this area-namely, what to do in cases of split domicil where
plaintiff's law calls for greater reparations than those provided by
defendant's law. 243 The structure of no-fault with the integration of
insurance as part and parcel of reparations makes it possible to
benefit Peter without robbing Paul. Accordingly, a second proposi-
tion may be added to the first, which would have been contradictory
to it under tort recovery principles-that is, neither the owner nor the
driver of the injuring automobile should be subjected to a reparation
burden greater than that imposed by the law of his home state, wher-
ever the place of the accident.
To put these two propositions together epigrammatically and in
the form of a "golden rule": to each according to his need, as deter-
mined by his state, and from each according to his obligation, as
defined by his own state.244 At first glance, this appears utopian in
that it combines the best of all possible worlds. It gives full protection
to the victim without overpenalizing the person on whom the respon-
sibility is placed. In point of fact, however, this golden rule is worka-
ble within the no-fault insurance framework, as will be demonstrated
241. See note 93 supra.
242. See note 94 supra.
243. See pp. - and note 96 supra.
244. Cf. CAVERS 153:
In this situation, the analysis we have been pursuing should entitle plaintiff to claim only
when, and to the extent that, the law of his own state should permit; similarly, the
defendant should be obligated to pay only when, and to the extent that, his state requires.
Cavers is referring to a wrongful death action involving citizens from two states having different
laws but more beneficial to the plaintiff than the law of the accident state. See also Reich v.
Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967), a wrongful death case, where
Justice Traynor used interests analysis Cavers-style to arrive at a comparable result:
A defendant cannot reasonably complain when compensatory damages are assessed in
accordance with the law of his domicile and plaintiffs receive no more than they would
had they been injured at home. Id. at 555, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
Cf House Subcomm. Hearings 116-19.
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shortly. At the same time, it epitomizes the personal approach which
occupies a central position in modern tort conflicts and is likely to
be acceptable to the exponents of the main new theories, at least to
those who are reconciled with the necessity of developing workable
conflicts rules or guidelines, subject to two possible qualifications.
First, it is true that the golden rule does not take into account the
potential concern of the accident state for local and medical and other
creditors, which concern has been used in support of the lex loci
delicti.215 Assuming this concern to be justified, however, the accident
state could and should be expected to enact special provisions impos-
ing liability, whether in negligence or without fault, upon the owner
or driver regardless of what his home state law provides. This would
appear, then, as a special exception to the second proposition of the
golden rule. There is clearly no reason why the existence of a concern
so limited should bring about the wholesale application of the repara-
tions system of the state of the accident to the basic claims of the
parties toward each other. From the viewpoint of the no-fault state,
this concern of the accident state need not be specially considered
since the insurance requirement imposed on its domiciliaries should
cover medical expenses for out-of-state accidents.
Second, there is some support for the view that the victim should
receive compensation under the most favorable of the potentially
applicable laws, even beyond the reparations requirements of his own
home state. This would mean, for example, that where defendant's
law, or where the law of the accident state, is more generous than
plaintiff's, the extra benefit should belong to the plaintiff.246 While the
defendant has no reason to complain here under the second proposi-
tion of the golden rule, placing his windfall within the reach of the
plaintiff is not consistent with the first proposition. It is submitted
that this approach, incorporating a pro-compensation bias on the
merits, violates the spirit of neutrality which should ideally prevail in
choice of law and, in practical terms, benefits the plaintiff beyond his
reasonable requirements. One of the fundamental premises of the
personal approach is that the victim's home state is the one most
concerned and best suited to determine his reparation needs. It is also
a fair assumption that the victim makes his plans against the law of
his home state and if for some reason he is dissatisfied with the
245. See note 95 supra.
246. See notes 114-19, 123 supra.
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protection provided under such law he is in a position to obtain excess
insurance. 47 For this reason, the golden rule has not been drafted to
allow recovery by the victim under the most favorable of his own law
or the owner-driver's law or the law of the state of the accident. For
those who espouse the contrary view, however, the rule could be
modified accordingly without departing from the total personal ap-
proach, at least in the split domicil cases.
The beauty of the golden rule is that it can be applied by a no-
fault state even in the worst possible interstate situation-namely, in
a "crazy-quilt" pattern where some states adopt no-fault variants
while others retain traditional negligence liability, and where some
states use the personal choice of law approach while others adhere
to the lex loci delicti. Furthermore, the golden rule is quite compre-
hensive. Not only does it furnish guidance in drafting the interstate
features of the no-fault plan and in deciding what situations it should
cover, but it also provides a choice of law principle for the situations
which are not covered. The emphasis here will be on the first function,
but the broader choice of law implications will also be explored in
order to provide a complete picture and to underscore the soundness
of the total personal approach.
The definitional problems relating to the concept of domicil have
already been mentioned, 4 and it must be conceded that no com-
pletely unambiguous label can be found for the kind of relationship
between a person and a state which would justify the application of
its law in all personal contexts. Given the desirability of subjecting
the parties involved in an automobile accident to the law of their
"home" state, accepting the wisdom of fashioning workable rules
based on available experience rather than relegating each case to an
ad hoc solution which depends upon the vagaries of the various mod-
ern methodologies, and recognizing the imperfectability of human
affairs, one should be able to agree on some terminology which would
express the basic idea, and rely on the specifics of the given definition
to adequately cover most situations. 249 For this purpose, the term
"domicil" itself could be used or preferably, the term "settled" or
"habitual" residence could be adopted 50 possibly reinforced by
247. See the views of Professor Rheinstein contained in CAVERS 45.
248. See note 89 supra.
249. See Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, supra note 104, at 646 n.4.
250. See note 89 supra. The term "habitual residence" is being extensively used in the
Hague Conventions. For an in-depth analysis of the issues in the domicil vs. habitual residence
choice and for extensive comparative and historical information, see DeWinter, Nationality or
Domicile? The Present State of Affairs, 128 HAGUE COURSES (III) 347, 419-78 (1969).
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presumptions-for example, that the state where an owner registers
his automobile and obtains his driver's license is his habitual resi-
dence. In view of the stringency of state requirements for registration
and licensing, it is unlikely that this would lead to registration-
shopping. Rental automobiles may be subjected to special treat-
mentil-for example, imputing the driver's law to the owner on the
assumption that the latter's insurance should carry this extra burden
in view of the commercial nature of the transaction. With this excep-
tion, where the driver is not the owner of the automobile, the liabili-
ties of each should be determined under his own personal law, and
this would extend to the question of the owner's imputed liability. For
corporations, which are generally defendants in automobile injury
cases, one might also adopt an alternative reference rule giving the
plaintiff, and his insurer through subrogation, the choice of the most
favorable law among those of incorporation, principal place of busi-
ness, or other major corporate connecting factor, at least to the extent
that such law is not more favorable to the plaintiff than his own law.
On the other hand, one might, in a more limited way, use the basic
criterion of registration or principal location of the automobile in-
volved to fix the law governing the defendant's obligations. 52
Those who place an even greater value on certainty, predictability
and ease of application may opt for the law of the place of the
automobile's registration over that of the habitual residence of the
parties on the theory that this usually coincides with that of the
owner-driver's residence,23 and because of the facilitation of insur-
ance planning, and possibly add some exceptions especially in favor
of the plaintiff injured in his own state, in a manner resembling that
of the Hague Convention 5' and the District of Columbia Plan.25
Assuming a proper definition of "home state," we may now con-
sider in some detail how the golden rule-from each according to his
251. See Palmer v. Hertz, 36 App. Div. 252, 258-59, 319 N.Y.S.2d 949, 957 (2d Dept.
1971).
252. See note 249 supra.
253. Cf A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 83, at 580; Compensation for Automobile Accidents:
A Symposium, 32 COLUI. L. REV. 785, 824 (1932). Professor Cavers has expressed, rather
unpersuasively, some doubts on the coincidence of registration and habitual residence in the
United States. See Cavers, Legislative Choice of Law, supra note 92, at 355 n.62; Cavers,
Contemporary Conflicts Law, supra note 92, at 169.
254. See note 92 supra. Cf. INT'L INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF A UNIFORM LAW ON CIVIL LIABILITY OF MOTORISTS, reprinted in
1948 YEARBOOK 172, 179.
255. See note 215 supra.
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obligation, as defined by his state, and to each according to his need,
as determined by his state-could be made to work in the context of
a compulsory and substantial no-fault plan.
The Total Personal Approach When All Parties Have Their Home
in the Same State
The conflicts problem is the simplest where all persons involved
in an accident come from the same state and the automobile or
automobiles involved are all registered or should have been registered
there. In this situation, the only thing that really makes sense for the
no-fault state is to extend its full plan, first-party benefits, limited
strict liability and tort exemption included, to its people and only to
them-regardless of where the accident took place and irrespective
of the content of the potentially applicable laws. Since the victims and
the owners-drivers have their home in the same state, the territorial
contacts may be essentially ignored, and since the automobile is or
ought to have been registered there, the insurance, or liability in its
absence, should conform to its laws.25
Where the victims come from the no-fault state, they will be
entitled to recover benefits under its system. Pursuant to the usual
no-fault provisions, the occupants of each automobile and the pedes-
trians injured by it will claim against its insurer. If an automobile is
uninsured when it ought to have been, the same victims may claim
against the owner or driver directly or against their own insurer, if
any, or against the assigned claims fund, with the paying insurer in
these cases being given a right of reimbursement. If the accident
involving persons and automobiles of the no-fault state occurred else-
where and litigation is commenced there, a court following the mod-
ern conflicts methodologies would recognize and apply the no-fault
state's law without hesitation. If the other state follows a strict lex
loci approach, however, it may insist on applying the local liability
or possibly no-fault law, as the case may be. For this reason, pending
nationwide modernization of conflicts rules, the insurance in the no-
256. Cf. the Fuld concurring opinion in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394,
301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969):
Without attempting too much, I believe that we may accept the following principles as
sound for situations involving guest statutes in conflicts settings:
I. When the gueit-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state, and
the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and determine the standard
of care which the host owes to his guest. . . . Id. at 585, 249 N.E.2d at 403-04, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 532.
[Vol. 1972:331
NO-FA UL T INS URA NCE
fault state should carry a rider covering payments that may have to
be made under the law of other states if held applicable, as is now
the case with liability insurance. In view of the full retreat of lex loci
and the fundamental changes introduced by no-fault, this eventuality
would tend to become remote.
In the reverse situation, where the accident involving persons and
automobiles of another state occurs in the no-fault state, there is no
good reason to apply its no-fault plan, except, possibly, in a limited
way for the protection of local creditors if the otherwise applicable
law completely bars recovery. In addition, it is burdensome and un-
conventional to require out-of-state automobiles temporarily in the
no-fault state to be subject to its full insurance requirements at the
penalty, possibly, of strict liability. Moreover, in order to put teeth
into such insurance requirements, the no-fault state may also have to
resort to interference with the insurance policies for out-of-state auto-
mobiles either directly or through compulsion over the insurance
companies doing business in the state. If action in this situation-that
is, of an accident involving out-of-staters in the no-fault state-were
brought in the no-fault state, the golden rule would call for the choice
of the common personal law of the parties, be it of the liability or
no-fault type. Some complications may arise if the action is brought
in a home forum which espouses the lex loci delicti, but this is really
not a problem of the no-fault state. The courts of such forum may
well find a way back to their own substantive law through the renvoi
process by recognizing the reference to -domiciliary law incorporated
in the no-fault state's interstate provisions. The choice of the personal
law is also appropriate in a situation where the applicable law is the
same for all parties and automobiles even though not of the same
state. This should not be treated differently than is the common
domicil situation. 5 7
A more difficult case is presented by the uncommon situation
where the automobile is properly registered in a state other than that
of the common home of the parties. For example, where it is regis-
tered in a liability state by a local domiciliary and an accident without
fault occurs in that state while it is driven by a no-fault state domici-
liary, and all injured parties are also no-fault state domicilaries. In
this case, it may be argued that it would be unfair to subject the
257. See Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Trautman,
Comments on Reich v. Purcell, supra note 11l, at 618-19.
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owner, and his insurer, to the no-fault liabilities. This argument,
however, is not entirely persuasive. In a pattern where some states
have switched to no-fault while others retain negligence liability, au-
tomobile owners, and their insurers, will have to face the possibility
of being subjected to responsibility under either system, irrespective
of whether the territorial or the personal approach is used in the
choice of law. Indeed, the personal approach in common domicil
cases will probably reduce the incidence of the application of out-of-
state law because it is more likely that an automobile will be involved
in an out-of-state accident than in an accident where all injured par-
ties are from the same state other than the state of registration."'
Furthermore, no-fault is not necessarily more burdensome to the
owner than tort liability. While it transforms negligence liability to
passengers and pedestrians into strict liability with added first-party
type benefits for the driver, it usually limits the amounts payable and
it also eliminates liability to the occupants of other vehicles. Where
the automobile comes from the no-fault state and the parties from a
liability state, the case will come under the residual liability coverage
of the insurance policy. In any event, even if one were to take the
domicil of the owner into account, the choice of law problem can be
solved under the different domicil rules.
To sum up, the total personalization of loss reparations, with
possibly the medical creditors territorial ripple, where all parties in-
volved are from the same state is workable and in harmony with the
teachings of modern conflicts, and is particularly consistent with the
compensatory orientation of no-fault. This is quite significant if one
considers that a substantial proportion of automobile accidents in-
volve a single automobile259 and that many two-car accidents injure
common domiciliaries.
The Personal Approach in Cases of Different Home States
Where the parties involved in an accident come from at least two
states having different reparations systems, the problem is more com-
plex. From the point of view of a no-fault state determined to give
the personal factor maximum play, the different features of the no-
fault package may be treated separately. No-fault is a coin with two
sides: a benefits side and an obligations side. With regard to benefits,
258. The latter situation is not likely to occur except when the automobile is rented.
259. Senate D.C. Hearings 115, 118.
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there is no difficulty whatsoever in permitting the insured owner and
additional insureds to recover the first-party type benefits provided
in the policy, regardless of fault, place of accident and place of regis-
tration. He paid for them and they are due to the insureds on a
contract basis. By the same token, no true first-party benefits should
be payable to anyone other than the insureds under a policy. This
would exclude uninsured owners who are non-domiciliaries of the no-
fault state or domiciliaries who failed for some reason to procure
insurance. It is the owners who are supposed to bear the burden of
insurance and limiting their benefits to those provided for in the
policy is entirely proper. Comparable considerations should apply to
automobile drivers.
Turning to the limited strict liability type benefits under no-
fault-that is, those payable to injured passengers and pedestri-
ans-the plan should then extend to only the domiciliaries of the no-
fault state in all circumstances and regardless of the locus of the
accident. The claims by persons from other states should be relegated
to their own laws, whether no-fault or liability, and should be handled
through the obligations side of the insurance. 60 Injured domiciliaries
who were uninsured and properly not covered by a no-fault pol-
icy-for example, pedestrians hit by an automobile driven by an out-
of-stater-should recover benefits through the assigned claims plan.
This is essentially the District of Columbia approach, in cases where
registration coincides with the domicil of the parties, expanded to
cover also the pedestrians.
On the obligations side, the plan should require all automobiles
registered in the state to carry the appropriate no-fault and residual
liability insurance. The tort exemption should be commensurate with
the insurance coverage. The insurance obligation would be easily
enforceable by conditioning registration upon appropriate proof of
insurance. The owners of automobiles which should have been regis-
tered in the no-fault state, but were not, would be personally subject
to the strict liability obligations of the plan as self-insurers. The
domiciliary victims would also be protected through the assigned
claims plan, their insurers being allowed to recoup from the unin-
260. Under the D.C. Act, the tort exemption applies only when benefits are recoverable
pursuant to its provisions. This leads to the undesirable result that claims between a D.C. person
and a person from a state with another type of no-fault system, or even the same type, are to
be determined in accordance with tort principles because of the residual preservation of liability.
The proposal in the text would eliminate this.
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sured owners the benefits which they have paid. Some no-fault plans
do not go this far, subjecting the uninsured owner instead to the
traditional negligence system and relying solely on criminal penalties
to enforce compliance with the insurance requirements. Thus, the no-
fault obligations are treated as recessive and the owner is allowed, at
least on the civil side, to opt out of no-fault by mere non-compliance.
It is submitted that treating the owner in substance as the insurer will
provide a stronger motive for compliance without putting an undue
burden on him since, after all, the no-fault obligations as lightened
by the limitations and exemption, are not, on the whole, narrower
than those of tort liability.
A domiciliary of the no-fault state, and his insurer, would be
subject to the limited strict liabilities of, and benefit from, the tort
exemption, only in his relationship to other domiciliaries. All claims
by non-domiciliaries against domiciliaries would be relegated to the
formers' personal law and would come under the residual liability
coverage of the domiciliaries' insurance policy.
The effect of this allocation of benefits, obligations and exemp-
tions is to make the no-fault plan applicable only to relationships
between persons from the enacting state. Non-domiciliaries are com-
pletely left out of it, and as a matter of a broader choice-of-law
principle, they are relegated to their own personal law. Since the
latter receive the full protection of their law on both the benefits and
liabilities sides, they obviously should have no basis for complaint.
How about the domiciliaries of the no-fault state, however, who,
as the insurance population of such state, will have to absorb the costs
of the no-fault plan? Is this allocation fair to them? Is there a gap in
insurance here for the benefit of non-domiciliaries at the expense of
the insurance population of the no-fault state? If no-fault domicili-
aries could recover full benefits in all instances under the no-fault
plan, whereas the corresponding obligations of the out-of-staters may
be more limited or non-existent under their own personal law, a
situation of long no-fault benefits and short liabilities could result,
with the difference borne by the no-fault insurers. At the other end,
such insurers may also find themselves exposed to greater obligations
than what would have been due under no-fault where an out-of-stater
injured by a domiciliary claims more under his own personal law.
These discrepancies are created by the second proposition of the
golden rule, which gives to the out-of-stater the full benefit of his own
law-a feat considered virtually impossible in a system of recovery
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under tort principles. Does this not prove that the golden rule places
an unfair burden on the insurance population of the no-fault state,
and is this not a good reason for rejecting the personal approach, at
least in the non-domiciliary versus domiciliary, and vice versa, con-
texts? The answer is clearly in the negative.
First, this kind of discrepancy would also exist under a no-fault
plan with territorial interstate features, where the insurer of a no-fault
state domiciliary involved in an out-of-state accident may have to pay
more under the lex loci delicti than the amount due under the no-fault
plan. The insurer would also be required by the lex loci delicti rule
to pay no-fault benefits to an out-of-stater injured in-state even where
his domiciliary law would have precluded even a limited recovery. In
both of these instances, the out-of-stater is likely not to have contrib-
uted anything to the no-fault state plan. The greater burden on the
insurer is a result of the juxtaposition of different reparations systems
and is not due to the choice of law approach used.
Second, this potentially greater exposure of the no-fault insurer
under either a territorial or a personal choice of law approach gener-
ally is not unfair is because it is matched by a potentially lesser
exposure which is as probable in occurrence and dimensions as the
greater one. Assuming that out-of-staters are statistically as likely to
be victims as actors in automobile accidents, the total payments to
them by the no-fault system under the golden rule would tend to be
about the same as the total receipts from them. To clarify this point
through an example, let it be assumed that the other state has re-
tained the tort liability system, including a guest statute. A domici-
liary of the no-fault state, who is injured as a passenger of an automo-
bile owned by an out-of-stater, would recover no-fault benefits
through the no-fault insurance system of his state; however, the pay-
ing insurer would not be able to recoup the benefits paid from the
out-of-stater, even if at fault, because the out-of-stater will be given
the benefit of the guest statute. In the reverse situation, however,
which should be just as likely, where an out-of-state passenger is
injured in a no-fault automobile, the insurer will pay nothing, even if
the driver was at fault, because, by the same token, the out-of-stater
will be burdened by the guest statute.
A subsidiary question in this area is whether the insurer paying
no-fault benefits to a domiciliary should be given only subrogation
or reimbursement rights in the claim against the out-of-stater obligor.
The proposed plans preserve the excess tort recovery, if any is avail-
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able under the applicable law, to the injured party and allow the
insurer only to recoup what he has in fact paid out. Under the New
York Plan, for example, a passenger in an automobile insured in New
York is placed in a better position when the accident occurs in a
liability state than when it occurs in New York. In the latter case,
he is entitled only to no-fault benefits under the applicable New York
law, whereas in the former he may also sue in tort and recover possi-
bly more under another law. This is inconsistent with the premise that
the law of one's own home state adequately provides for his
reparations needs. The better solution would be to limit no-fault
domiciliaries to no-fault benefits only, while providing for the assign-
ment by law of the tort claim, if any, to the paying insurer, with the
result that the additional recoveries of the insurance system will re-
duce in the long run the burden carried by the insurance population
of the no-fault state.261
The Total Personal Approach: An Illustration
Because of space limitations, the recommended features of the
total personal approach for no-fault were given only in compact
outline, and in view of the complexity of the subject, it may be useful
to illustrate how they would operate by means of a hypothetical case.
Let it be assumed that state X is the state enacting the no-fault
plan, that state Y has another personal no-fault plan, and that state
Z is a traditional liability and lex loci delicti state with a guest statute.
A collision occurs in Y between (1) an automobile registered and
insured in X, owned and driven by A, an X domiciliary, and (2) an
automobile registered and insured in Z, owned and driven by D, a Z
domiciliary. A is the only negligent party. Both drivers are injured
as well as B, a domiciliary of X, and C, a domiciliary of Y, who are
both guest passengers in A's automobile, and E, an X domiciliary,
and F, a Z domiciliary, who are both guest passengers in D's automo-
bile. P1 and P2, pedestrians domiciled respectively in X and Z, are
also injured in the collision. Actions are brought in X. Who recovers
what from whom? The answer may be best presented in tabular form:
261. A statutory provision to that effect would overcome any problems arising from the
common law rules against the assignment of unliquidated tort claims. See 6 C.J.S. Assignments
§§ 32-33 (Supp. 1971).
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Recoveries Payors
No-fault (first party) benefits
under the X plan .......... A's insurer
No-fault (strict liability)
benefits under the X plan ... A's insurer
No-fault (strict liability)
benefits under the Y plan ...
Claim in tort under Z law ....
No-fault (strict liability)
benefits under the X plan ...
A's insurer
A and eventually his insurer
E's own X insurer, if any.
Otherwise X's Assigned
Claims Plan, without subro-
gation
Claim in tort under Z law .... A and eventually his insurer
No-fault (strict liability)
benefits under the X plan ... A'sinsurer
Claim in tort under Z law .... A and eventually his insurer
What if only D were at
fault?
No-fault (first-party)
benefits under the X plan
No-fault (strict liability)
benefits under the X plan
No-fault (strict liability)
benefits under the Y plan
Nothing
No-fault (strict liability)
benefits under the X plan
... From A's insurer, with sub-
rogation to the tort claim of
A against D under Z law
From A's insurer with sub-
rogation in B's tort claim
against D under Z law
... From A's insurer with sub-
rogation in C's tort claim
against D under Z law
... E's own X insurer, if any.
Otherwise from X's As-
signed Claims Plan, without
subrogation in view of the Z
guest statute
Parties
A
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Parties Recoveries Payors
F Nothing, in view of Z's
guest statute
P No-fault (strict liability)
benefits under the X plan ... A's insurer, with subroga-
tion in the tort claim of P.
against D under Z law
P 2 Claim in tort under Z law .... D and eventually his insurer
It is to be noted that the fact that the accident happened in Y is
irrelevant to this allocation of claims and responsibilities. If state Y,
however, insisted on protecting its local creditors and imposed, for
example, commensurate liabilities upon those driving on its highways
for the benefit of their passengers, then D, and his insurer, may have
been held liable for the local expenses of F in the second situation
despite the Z guest statute, and the courts in X would have recognized
this liability.
Assuming that A was required under the law of X to carry insur-
ance for the liabilities described in the first example and had failed
to do so, he would be personally liable directly or through subroga-
tion, as the case may be, under the same principles. In the second
example, A would be required to pay no-fault benefits to B, C, and
P1, even though he was not negligent, but he would also be subro-
gated, at least pro tanto, to their claims against D. One could consid-
erably simplify the drafting problem for the interstate features of no-
fault by focusing only on when the plan does and when it does not
apply, leaving the choice of law question in the latter instance for
resolution under general conflicts principles. The plan would then
incorporate provisions covering only the benefits recoverable by A,
B, E and P1 and the obligations imposable on A and on D.
The foregoing illustrative case was intentionally based on a very
complicated fact pattern, not likely to occur often in reality, in order
to explore the most distant ramifications of the total personal ap-
proach, and to demonstrate that it can be made to work. While the
lex loci delicti rule is obviously easier to apply, the very essence of
modern conflicts lies in the rejection of simple and easy rules when
they lead to unreasonable and haphazard results, in favor of a search
for ways of vindicating the policies underlying the potentially applica-
ble laws. The practical burden placed on the courts in selecting the
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law applicable to each individual claim under domiciliary criteria is
not too great and is, in fact, insignificant when measured against the
goal achieved-namely, giving each person the full benefits and pro-
tection of his own law. The modern approaches have liberated con-
flicts from the notion, derived from some vague feeling of equality,
that in a federal union a single law should govern all claims from an
occurrence such as an accident.
From the constitutional viewpoint, domicil or residence of the
parties is a sufficient contact to generate state interests and justify the
application of a state's law-especially to issues of loss reparation or
liability, under the full faith and credit and due process clauses. 262 The
different treatment of domiciliaries and non-domiciliaries through
the choice-of-law process and in recognition of the differing state
interests does not present equal protection problems, especially when
each party is relegated to his own personal law.26
262. After decades of judicial activism in the conflicts field, the Supreme Court, consis-
tently with the philosophy underlying Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), has been interpreting the full faith and
credit and the due process clauses of the Constitution in a way granting to the states the greatest
autonomy in the choice of law. For a description of this evolution see CURRIE, SELECTED
ESSAYS 188-288; WEINTRAUB 379-422; Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law,
28 LAW & CONTEMP PROB. 706-31 (1963). According to Cavers:
The Supreme Court has granted ample room for the exercise of [state] autonomy by
imposing constitutional restraint only when a state's assertion of authority goes beyond
any reasonable state purpose or is found to impair a national policy. CAVERS 217.
The latest pronouncement by the Supreme Court on this point supports this interpretation:
Where more than one state has a sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in
question, the forum state, by analysis of the interests possessed by the states involved,
could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another state
having such an interest in the multistate activity. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S.
1, 15 (1962).
The use of the common domiciliary law of the parties is well entrenched in various conflicts
rules, and there is no reason to suppose that its extension into the automobile accident area
will face any constitutional obstacles. The same would be true for a choice of law system which
in a split domicil case gives to each party the benefit of his own home state's law, as suggested
in the text. In fact, the Supreme Court case law, as developed in the workmen's compensation
context, on the interests of the home states of the parties, especially that of the victim, to apply
their own law on issues of compensation clearly supports the propriety of the use of personal
considerations. See, e.g., 3 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 86.33, 87-60
(1968, Supp. 1971); Larson, Constitutional Law Conflicts, supra note 161, at 1055, 1060.
263. For the best and most comprehensive analysis of unconstitutional discrimination in
conflicts law, see CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS 445-83. See also CAVERS 144-45; R. CRAMTON &
D. CURRIE, supra note 74, at 422-29; WEINTRAUB 422-26. While the indiscriminate denial of
the benefits of local laws to out-of-staters or the indiscriminate imposition of burdens on them
presents obvious equal protection problems, the use of the domicil or residence of the parties
as a neutral factor in the choice of law in a way intended to give maximum recognition to
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CONCLUSION
The 1970's have been called the decade of no-fault on the expecta-
tion that during this period the nation will reconsider the wisdom of
using subjective rather than objective criteria in fashioning the rules
dealing with loss distribution, continuation of personal relationships
and other fundamental questions. The battle of no-fault for automo-
bile loss reparations represents probably the most important confron-
tation between the traditional and the reform views, and unless the
Congress steps in with a bold national no-fault plan or strict guide-
lines, the outcome of the confrontation at the state level in this area
is likely to be a patchwork of automobile no-fault variants co-existing
side by side with tort liability for some time to come. In this kind of
a setting, choice of law problems are bound to be multiplied and
compounded to an unprecedented degree.
Modern conflicts law is in a state of ferment and revolution, and
no new methodology, let alone rules, may claim general acceptance.
The no-fault legislator could take the easy way out by merely pre-
scribing substantive rules and leaving to the courts the Herculean task
of figuring out the conflicts consequences. This would place the courts
in the virtually impossible position of first having to adapt their
preferred conflicts approach to the no-fault plan of their state and
then having to resolve the conflicts controversies as they arose on an
ad hoc basis, with the hope that precedent would eventually crystal-
lize into workable guides, principles, rules or some kind of wisdom,
as the case may be. Indeed, if the courts were led to follow the views
of those modern theorists who prize methodology as an end in itself,
to be pursued at all costs and regardless of results, in what may be
termed a quixotic quest for perfection, each case would become a
cause celebre, a monument to the technical virtuosity and ideological
purity of the judges who decided it and a milestone in the eternal
search for conflicts truth!
The authors of no-fault, being principally practical men with a
bird-in-the-hand mentality, introduced rather specific, clear-cut rules
on the sphere of application of their plans in order to resolve most
legitimate governmental interests is beyond reproach. Cf. CAVERS 557-72. No federal case has
been found invalidating a neutral state conflicts rule determining private rights on the basis of
the home law of the parties involved, as proposed in the text. The tendency of the Supreme
Court to remove itself from the conflicts area will probably lead to an unconstitutionality
decision only in the most offensive situation.
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conflicts controversies in predictable and, what appeared to them to
be, just ways, leaving only the fringe cases to the ingenuity of the
courts. This option for certainty in an extremely complex field is, on
balance, to be applauded," 4 but one cannot but be critical of the
content of many of the rules adopted. In the melange of territorial
and personal factors used in the various no-fault plans, the former
generally predominate, apparently due less to an ideological commit-
ment to the lex loci delicti and more to old habit. This ignores the
greatest contribution of modern conflicts theory-policy analy-
sis-which in evaluating the connecting factors and delineating their
sphere of application, focuses on the purposes intended to be imple-
mented by the substantive laws which are potentially in conflict. The
compensatory orientation of no-fault automobile reparations and the
reliance upon compulsory insurance to distribute the losses make the
territorialization of the new legislation singularly inappropriate.
While it may be true that the links between persons and states, espe-
cially in a federal context, are not as permanent as in times of yore,
they certainly are materially closer and more significant than the
connections between a person and the place where he might be in-
volved in an automobile accident.
A personal system of choice of law incorporating explicit direc-
tives based on domicil or habitual residence, adequately defined, giv-
ing to all parties the benefits of, and imposing on them the obligations
under, their own home state law, with certain minor territorial
exceptions for special problems, is clearly more consistent with the
goals of no-fault automobile reparations than a territorial or any
other presently known system. Tested against the principal conflicts
desiderata, such a system is superior. It promotes certainty, predicta-
bility and uniformity of result as well as ease in the determination of
the law to be chosen. The basic policies of no-fault and the justified
expectations of the parties are effectuated through determination of
the rights and liabilities of each party according to the law of his
home state, the state most likely to be concerned with his protection
and long-term welfare. Furthermore, by relying on a neutral factor,
namely the domicil or habitual residence of the parties, it escapes the
pro-compensation bias and the vagaries of the forum law preference
inherent in some modern theories and helps advance harmonious
relations between states, serving well the cause of interstate collabo-
264. Cf. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, supra note 88, at 319-20.
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ration. Finally, it is also more consonant with modern torts conflicts
which would govern the residual liability remaining in effect under
most no-fault plans. All in all, the no-fault automobile loss repara-
tions present a unique opportunity to put to good use what is best in
modern conflicts, and it is to be hoped that the occasion will not be
missed.
